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THE PROBLEM AND THE PROCEDURE 
Civil liberty connotes a freedom i mplying a right 
to protection against both governmental and private 
interference, but it is essentially a right of the in-
dividual against the authoritarian state. In these days 
of world-wide struggle between opposing political philo-
sophies there is much thought given to human rights an d 
civil liberties. Under totalitarian governments in 
much of the world, civil rights have all but vanished. 
In the Democracies, under stress of war, personal liber-
ties disappear. 
Democracy does not guarantee liberties to t he 
individual, since there is constant danger that the 
majority will disregard the rights of the minority . To 
cite only one example, there has been in .America a fla-
grant violation of the civil rights of the negro through 
lack of proper adlninistration of laws intended to protect 
him. In the Democracies, as in the tota.li tarian states, 
the modern tendency is toward a relaxation in civil 
liberty and a loss of many s pecific rights of the in-
dividual. Increasing governmental control, necessitated 
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by the complexities of modern social and i ndustrial 
life, results in continuous encroachments upon the 
rights fundamental to the older philosophy of in-
dividualism. Under guise of protecting health, morals, 
and safety the maj ority has succeeded in ~rriting into 
law its views on morality, religion, and politics in 
such a way as frequently to interfere with the civil 
liberties of i ndividuals • 
.America contributed to the idea of protecting 
civil liberties by writing guarantees of such liberties 
into constitutions which could not be easily changed, 
and then uniquely provided f or review of such guaran-
tees by the courts. This places in the hands of the 
courts the final decision as to the scope of civil 
liberties in A.merica. The Bills of Ri ghts as they stand 
today in our federal and state constitutions are little 
more than collections of glittering generalities until 
applied to specific cases by decisions of the courts. 
The Problem 
The people of Kansas are gua~anteed certain rights 
and liberties in the twenty sections of the Bill Of 
Rights in the Kansas constitution, but there is room for 
much difference of opinion as to just what these quar-
antees include. The right to ttlife, liberty , and pursuit 
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of happiness" as provided in Section I is so general 
as to be open to dozens of interpretations and can 
have little real meaning until applied to specific 
cases. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to s how t he 
meaning of the Kansas Bill of Rights as determined by 
the Kansas Supreme Court in the many cases whi ch have 
involved t hese ri ghts. The thesis can show to t he 
reader only wh at the court has determined in th e pas t 
and the meaning of the Bill of Rights onl y as i t 
applies oo those situations which have been brought 
before the court. There ar e vast, potentia l meanings 
which will be brought to light only in t he f uture as 
the court is asked to decide in other cases t he meaning 
of the constitution and the l aw. 
Since there is so much concer n at the pre s ent 
time over the preservation of personal liber t ies, and 
since the general constitutional guarant ees mean so 
little without court interpr etation, and since t he l ay-
man is not f amiliar with past interpretations--it seems 
important to present in t hi s thesis t he meaning of t he 
Kansas Bill of Rights as determined by the Court. So 
far as the writer is able to determine there has been 
no research on this particular phase of t he Kansas Con-
stitution and the matter has been one of concern only 
for judges and lawyers. 
The Procedure 
In determining the meaning of t he Kansas Bill 
of Rights, Supreme Court cases f r om 1861 t o and i n-
cluding 1940 were s t udies. Shepard's Citations , 
Hatcher's Digest, Constitutiona l Annotations, and 
4 
Court Report indexes wer e consulted in an at tempt to 
locate each and every case which pertai n ed i n any way 
to any sect ion of t he Bill of Rights. · Many of the 
cases s t udied f a iled to show any definit e gr ound s f or 
violation of the Bill of Rights and are not i ncluded 
herein. Each case was studied to determi ne t he poi nt 
of law and the principles e s t ablished by t he dec ision. 
It is these court determined principles that are offered 
as the established meaning of the Kansas Bill of Ri ghts. 
The Organization 
In the chapters that f ollow, there wi l l be pre-
sented a brief review of the history of civil l ibert i es 
from ancient times through t he :Medieval and modern per i ods; 
the English background of Juner ican lib er ties ; and t he 
development of individual rights in t h e .American colonies 
and in the young United States. A special chapter will be 
devoted to the i mmediate historical background of t he 
Kansas Bill of Ri ghts, sho,Afing how it was transplant ed 
from earlier Ohio constitutions; and t hen in f ive 
chapters there will be set forth the principles of 
personal liberties as they have been determi ned by the 





Civil Liberty a Product of the Past 
Civil liberty is essentially a modern concept, 
allied with philosophies of individualism and liberalism, 
but one can not fully understand this concept vdthout 
realization that it is a. product of the past . Some of 
the guarantees which are written into pr esent day con-
stitutions were won centuries a.go as a result of long 
struggle against authoritarian states . Through the years 
these persona l liberties were successively attained and 
lost as they gradually won l ast· ng foothold s which today 
are firmly embedded in .Amer ican constitutions to be given 
meaning by .American courts. 
Personal Liberty in .Ancient Times 
Civil liberty was unknown to the ancient world. In 
the early days of civilization there was only one philo-
sophy of sovereignty. The individual belonged to the 
state body and soul and t he despotisms of this early age 
had no room for the concept of individual rights . Even 
under the Greek democracy there was little real civil 
lbierty since the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle 
suborinated the individua.l to the state. Individual 
rights that did exist in the Greelc democracy could at 
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any time be swept away by the majority without r estriction. 
Similarly , the Romans guaranteed no l asting per sonal 
liberties. 
Eersonal Liberty in Medieval Times 
The first germs of civil liberty appeared in the 
Stoic Philos9phy of justice to t he individual and were 
later developed in the doctrine of Christi anity . This 
doctrine alleged t o the individual hiraself duti~s and 
obligations higher t han those imposed by tempora l rulers 
and thus created a philosppµy which could regar d resis-
tance to constituted authority in cert a i n cases as an 
act of piety rather than of heresy . Such a philosophy 
prepared the way for the later doctrine of natural 
rights. The Renaissance and the Reformat ion f urthered 
the idea of individual liberty and toleration. Mediaeval 
towns and cities he'id various right s and privileges whi ch 
were virtual libe-rties of the individual. The growth of 
the national state with its resort to representative 
government emphasized the f act that the individual citizen 
was a thing apart from the state with interests and 
privileges of his ovm. A conception of individual liberty 
found little place in feudal society though the feudal 
technique of bargain and contract undoubtedly i:Q.lluenced 
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the methods by which civil liberty was l ater s ecured. 
English Liberties 
The immediate background for Amer ican civil liberties 
is f ound in England. There the struggle for civil 
liberties began as a phase of the struggle of t he feudal 
lords to maintain some degree of autonomy i n the f ace of 
inc r easing centralizat i on of power in the hands of the 
king . Privileges and rights won by limited groups were 
gradually extended to all classes and the idea of civil 
libert y became embodied in doctrine and its principles 
preserved in written documents. 
Magna Cart a 
The earliest of these docmnents was the Magna Carta 
which was VITung by the barons from King John in 1215 . 
There is much disagreement as to the pla c e of Magna Carta 
in t he history of civil lib erties. Radin1 says t hat this 
document gave the feudal propert y law its form and direction 
and secured merely as a sort of casual incident some of t he 
political rights of free men of t he t ime . Bruun2 says t hat 
when in the seventeenth century, the parliamentar y opp osition 
cited Magna Carta as t he original guaranty of liberty , f air 
trial, and representat ive gover nment, they wer e misreading 
what was in reality a feud a l agreement. Magna Carta did 
incident ally state cert ain arbitrary acts from which the king 
1. Radin, Anglo-Americ an Legal History. p . 531. 
2. Bruun, A Survey of European Civilization . Vol. I , p. 197 . 
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was to refrain, forbade the sale of justice, and held 
that no man was to be deprived of property, i mprisoned, 
or banished sa.ve by legal judgment of his peers and the 
law of the land. 
The Petit i on of Ri ghts 
This meager list of rights was enlar ged by the 
Petition of Rights which Charles I reluctantly accepted 
in 1628 in return for parli amentary cooperation i n raising 
taxes. This petition , one of the cornerstones of British 
freedom , was a clear s tatement of the illegality of the 
exercise of absolute power to infringe certain crucial 
rights. It condemned the billeting of soldiers upon the 
people, the collect ion of loans or taxes not s anctioned 
by Parliament, and the i mprisonment of any pers on vd t hout 
specific char ge or orderly trial. 
The Bill of Ri ghts 
The third great charter of English liberty was the 
Bill of Ri ghts which emerged from the Revolution of 1688. 
This document provided: 3 (1) That the soverei gn ha d no 
power to suspend or dispense with the laws, to erect 
special courts of justice, maintain a standing army, or 
levy taxes without the consent of Parliament. ( 2 ) That 
Parliament should meet frequently, the members to be 
freely elected and allowed freedom in their debates. 
-----------------------------------------------------3. Ibid., p. 47. 
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(3) That subjects were entitled to petit ion t he monarch 
without fear of prosecution, that those char ged with crimes 
could not be refused jury trial, nor could t hey be exposed 
to cruel or unusual puni shments. 
It is out of such specific provis ions as t hos e found 
in the documents above that t he gener a l doctr i ne of civil 
liberties has developed----Though it should be r emembered 
that these documents in turn have borrowed from principles 
of Comm.on Law and from fundamentals of liber t y which wer e 
ach ievffinents of other peoples before t hem. 
Personal Liberty i n the .Araerican Coloni es 
Colonization of .Americ a gave new for s e to the growt h 
of civil liberties ., Many colonies wer e prot ected by charters 
or definite contracts to which t hey uld appeal as defens e 
against arbitrary or oppres s ive measures . By r efusing t o 
vote local taxes for administration and defens e the coloni sts 
could gargain for privileges which sometimes exce eded t hose 
of Englishmen at home. Thus through custom, bar gain, and 
acquiesence the range of civil liber t y was extended , though 
in greatly varying degrees as the thirteen colonies gave 
different connotations to freedom of sp eech, press, assem-
blage, and religion. Later when Engl and sought to squelch 
these growing liberties in the American colonies, Revolution 
burst forth and the struggle for individual liberty was 
tied to a struggle for national autonomy. This struggle 
was backed by a philosophy of f re edom s et f orth i n t he 
Declaration of Independence. 
The Declarat ion of I nd ependenc e 
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Th e American Declaration of Independence i s a 
restat ement of the phi losophy of natur a l ri ght s which 
was elabora ted by John Loc ke at t he t ime of the Engl i sh 
Revolution of 1688 . This document held that certain 
rights, among them the r i ght of lif e, l i ber t y , and pur-
suit of happines s, a re natura l and i nal ienabl e an d ar e 
f orever reserved to t he individual. The Decl ar ation 
asserted the doctrine t hat government i s t he agent of 
it.s people, and i t i mplied rights much broader than 
those expressed in p revious English char t er s . I t 
possessed f lexibili ty which made pos s i ble addi t i on of 
new rights or i mmunities a s they came to be de emed f un-
damental, and it announced a polit ical philosophy which 
later was incorporated into t he Const i t ut i on of the 
United. States. 
The Constitution of the U. s . 
The United Sta tes Constitution origi nally contained 
no st atement of civil liberties beyond prot ect i on aga i nst 
bills of attainder, ex pos t f acto l aws , punishment for 
constructive treason, obligation of cont r act s , and deni al 
of habeas corpus and tria l by j ury in cr i mi nal ca ses . 
North Carolina refused to ratify t he Constitution 
because it contained no Bill of Ri ghts, and severa l 
other states ratified with the understanding t hat i m-
mediate opportunity would be g iven for amendment. Out 
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of almost eighty amendments proposed, tne were adopted, 
and the Constitution had A Bill of Rights whi a.h guaren-
teed civil liberties to its people. The provisions were 
for the most part copied from existing state constitutions 
which were in turn expressions of the civil r i ghts of 
Englishmen of the day . The Constitution did not create 
civil liberty--it expressed traditions which had existed 
for centuries in Anglo-Saxon life. This .American Bill 
of Rights denies to Congress the power of making l aws 
interfering ¼~th religious freedom, or abr idging the free-
dom, o~ the press or the right of petit i on; it guar ant ees 
the citizen against arbitrary arrest and a.gs.inst unreason-
able search and seizure; it asserts i n positive t erms t he 
right of trial by jury ; it forbids exc essive ba il, ex-
cessive fines, and excessive i mprison.ments; it declares 
that all powers that lie outside those enumerated in hhe 
Constitution as belonging to the Federal Gover nment are 
reserved to the people and to the s t ates. 
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CHAPTER III 
HISTORY OF THE KANSAS BILL OF RI Gms 
Territorial Constitutions 
From the turmail created in the territory of Kansas 
by the struggle between anti-s laver y and pro- s l avery 
factions, there emerged in less than four yea.rs four 
separate sta t e constitutions , each. one framed by a con-
vention, submitt ed to popular vote, and by its own 
partisans declared adopted. Thes e four constitutions 
in order were: (1) Topeka fr ee-state constitution of 
November 11, 1855 (2) Lecompton constitut i on of 
November 7, 1857 (3) Leavenworth const itut ion of April 3, 
18 58 and the (4) Wyandotte constitution of July 29 , 1859 . 
The Lecompton constitut ion was , drawn up b., the pr6-sla.very 
group and the other constitutions by the free-state people . 
All four documents were submi tted to Congr ess , but onl y 
the Wyandotte received the necessary approval, and that 
only after a number of southern members had l eft the Senate 
in the secession movement. 
Bills of Rights wer e prominent parts of each of these 
territori al constituti ons. 1 Article I of the Topeka con-
stitution set forth a Bill of Rights of Twenty-two sections 
1. Frank W. Blackmar, Kansas,! Cyclopedia of State 
History. Vol. I, p. 415-22 
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which contained substantially the same guarantees as 
were later incorporated into the Wyandott e constitution. 
The Lecompton constitution concluded with a Bill of Rights 
which varied little from the Topeka constitution except 
for section 23 which read, "Free negroes shall not be 
permitted to live in this state under any circumstances". 
The Bill of Rights in the Leavenworth constitution was 
largely a repetition of that of the Topeka constitution . 
Ohio Constitution as Source for Kansas Bill of Rights 
The Wyandotte constitution was modeled after the 
Ohio Constitution of 1851. Twelve of the fift y-two mem-
bers at the Wyandotte convention in 1859 were from the 
st ate of Ohio and they naturally favored the use of their 
native sta t e document as a pattern for t heir work2 • The 
Ohio Bill of Rights in the constitution of 1851 was copied 
from the earlier Ohio constitution of 1802 a.nd this in 
turn was patterned after the provisions in constitutions 
of Kentucky and New York . Bills of Ri ghts in these early 
constitutions and charters which in turn pat terned after 
civil liberties as provided in English documents and 
Common Law. Thus, our own present day Bill of Ri hts can 
be traced back to the early _rights of Englishmen. 
Study of the Bills of Rights in the Kansas and the 
Ohio constitutions shows that much was t aken verbatim from 
the Ohio document. Out of the twenty sections in our Bill 
2. W. G. Cutler, History of the State of Kansas. p. 174. 
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of rights, four sections are copied verbatim from 
Ohio; five sections are altered by only t wo or three 
words; and nine other sections are similar. Ohio has 
a section forbid ding s:uspension of l aws hi ch Kans a s 
did not adopt, and Kansas h as added a s ection defining 
treason and a section giving aliens the s ame p roper t y 
rights as citizens.(In 1888 the l atter Kansas section 
was amended) 
The Kansas Bill of Ri ghts 
The Bill of Ri ghts i n our present s t ate cons titution 
consists of the following t wenty s ections: 3 
BILL OF RIGHTS 
1. Equal rights. All men ar e poss s sed of 
equal and inalienable natural ri ghts , among 
which are life , liberty , and the pursuit of 
happiness. 
2. Political power; privileges . All politi-
cal power is inherent in t he people, and al l free 
governments are founded on t heir authori t y , and 
a.re instituted for their equal pr otect i on and 
benefit. No special privileges or immunit ies 
shall ever be granted by t he legi slat ure, which 
may not be altered , revoked or repea led by t he 
same body; and this power shall be exercised by 
no other tribunal or agency. 
3. Petition, etc. The people have the ri ght 
to assemble, in a peaceable manner, to consult 
for their common good, to instruct their repre-
sentatives, and to petition the government, or 
any department thereof,. for the redres s of 
grievances. 
3. I. L. Iles, The Government .£f. Kansas. pp. 65-67. 
4. Bear Arms; armies. The people have t he 
right to beararIDs f or their defens e and security ; 
but standing ar mies , in time of peace, are dan-
gerous to liberty, and shall not be t olerat ed , and 
the mi iliit ary shall be in strict subordinat ion to 
t he civil power. 
5. Trial .!?.I .J.Err. The r i ght of tri al by 
jury shall be inviolate. 
6. Slaver y prohi bited. There s hall be no 
slaver y i n this s t ate ; and n o i nvoluntary servi-
tude, except for t he punishment of cr i me , whereof 
the party shall have been dul y convicted . 
7. Religious liberty. The r i ght to worsh ip 
Go d accordi ng to t he dictates of consc ienc e shall 
never be infr inged ; nor shall any per son be com-
pelled to att end or support any form of worship; 
nor shall any cont r ol of or i nt er f er ence with the 
r i ghts of conscience be permitted, nor· any pr e-
f er ence given by l aw t o any re l i gi ous est abl i shment 
or mode of worship. No religi ous test or property 
qualification shall be r equired for any offi ce of 
public t r ust, nor f or any vote a t any e l e c t i on , 
nor shall any person be incompet ent to t esti fy 
on a ccount of r eligious belief. 
8 . Habea s corpus. The r i ght t o the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be su spended , unl ess the 
public s afety r equires i t in case of i nvas ion or 
rebellion. 
9. Bail. All persons shall be a a ila.ble by 
suffici~sureties exc ept for capi tal off ense~, 
where proof is evident or t he presumption gr eat . 
Excessive bail a.hall not be required , nor exc es -
s ive fine s i mp osed, nor cr uel or unusual punish-
ment inflicted . 
10 . Trial; def ense of accused. I n al l pro-
s ecutions, the accus ed sha.11 be allowed to appear 
and defend in person, or by counsel ; t o demand 
the nature and caus e of t h e a ccusati on against him; 
to meet the vitness f ace to f ace, and to have 
compulsory process to compel t he at t endance of 
witnes ses in his behalf, and a speedy t rial by an 
impartial jury of th e county or distr ict i n vhich 
the offense is alleged to have been commi t t ed . 
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No person shall be a witness against himself, or 
be t wice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
11. The Press; libel. The liberty of the press 
shall be inviolate; and all persons may freely 
speak, write or publish their s entiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such 
right; and in all civil or criminal actions for 
libel, the truth may be g iven in evidence to the 
jury, and if it shall appear that the alleged 
libelous matter was published for justifiable 
ends, t he ac cused party shall be acquitted. 
12. No person transported. etc. No person 
shall betransported from the state for any 
offense committed within the s ame, and no con-
viction within the state shall work a corruption 
of blood or a forfeiture of estate . 
13. Treason . Treason shall consist only of 
levying war against the state, adhering to its 
enemies, or giving t hem aid and comfort. No 
person shall be convicted of treason unl ess on the 
evidence of two witnesses to t he overt act, or 
confession in open court. 
14. Soldiers. No soldier shall, i n time of 
peace, be quartered in any house vli thout t he con-
sent of the occupant, nor in time o war , except as 
presc r ibed by law. 
15. Search and seizure. The right of the 
people to be secure in t heir persons and propert y 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
be inviolat e; and no warrant shall issue but on 
probable ·cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing theplace to be searched 
and the per sons or property to be seized. 
16. Imprisonment for debt. No person shall be 
imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud. 
l?. Pro~erty rights of citizens and a liens. 
No distinction shall ever be made between citizens 
of the st ate of Kansas and the citizens of other 
states and territories of the United States in 
reference to the purchases, enjoyment or descent 
of property. The rights of aliens in reference 
to the purchase, enjoyment or descent of property 
may be r egulated by law. (Note--this section was 
submitted to and adopted by the people at the 
election held in 1888 . The original section l? 
l? 
was as follows: "No distinct ion shall ever 
be:unade between citizens and a liens in ref er-
ence t o the purchase, en j oyment or descent of 
property" . 
18. Justice without delay. All persons , 
for injuries s uffered in person, reputation, 
or property, shall have r emedy by due course 
of law, ancl justice administrated ·ithout de-
lay. 
19. Emoluments , et c. No hereditary 
emoluments, honors , or privileges sh all ever 
be granted or conferred by this state . 
20 . Powers not delegated. Thi s enumeration 
of rights shall not be construed t o i mpair or 
deny others r et ained by the people ; and all 





PETITION; A."RMS ; WORSHIP ; PRESS ; EMOLUMENTS 
This chapter i ncludes sect ions 3 , 4 , 7, 11, and 19 
of the Bill of Rights. Section 19 , prohibiting the con-
ferring of her editary emo l uments by the state , has never 
been involved in any case before the Supreme Court . 
Sectian 4, deali ng with the right to bear arms , has been 
directly involved on only one occasion, that i n 1905. In 
t wo clear cases section 3 , granting the r i ght to assem-
blage and petition, has been before the Court . Sections 
7 and 11, providing freedom of worshi p and freedom of 
speech and press, have been invol ved i n numerous cases, 
severa l of which have been r ather recently before the 
court. 
Section 3. of t he Bill of Rights: 
The people have the right to assemble, i n a 
peaceable manner, t o consult for t heir common 
good, to i nstruct their repr esent atives , and t o 
petition the goTermaent, or any depart ment thereof, 
for the redress of grievances. 
In the case of Flynn~- Brotherhood .2.f. Railroad 
Trainmen lllK. 415. (1922), the defendent was dropped 
from a trainmen's beneficiary organization bec ause he had 
violated one of its by-laws in petitioning di rectly 
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to the district superint endent r ather than through the 
organization. Later,' af ter Flynn's death, his wi dow 
sued for benefits f rom the organization on the grounds 
that for them to drop Flynn from membership f or his act 
was a violation of his right to petition as provided in 
the Bill of Ri ghts. The Court held that there wa s no 
viola tion of constitutional r i ghts , that Fl ynn coul d 
elect to_ belong to the organization, and that after such 
free choice he was bound to ab i de by the regulations of 
the organization_ or resign. 
In the cas e of State~· Board of Education 122K. 
701.(1927), a ci ty school district after a long struggle 
succ~eded in getting a statute passed by the legis l ature 
which enabled the district _to annex out l ying districts 
upon favorable vote of a ma jority of t he residents there-
in. The minority ·in s uch out l ying di ~tricts ch arged 
that the city school district consp ired i n influencing 
the legislature. The court he l d that the city school 
board or any group has the right to assemble and to 
petition and mi ght legally seek relief by using such 
measures to infiliuence legi s l ature. 
Section!• of the Bill of Ri ghts: 
The people have the right to bear arrns f or their 
defense and security; but standing armies, in time 
of peace, are dangerous t o libert y , and shal l not be 
tolerated, and the military shall be in strict sub-
ordination to the civil power. 
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In the case of City of Salina. y_. ,Blaksley 72K. 
230 (1905), the Court h eld that th is se ct ion is a limita-
tion on the l~gislative power to e nac t l aws prohibiting 
the bearing of arms in the militia or any other military 
organization provided by l aw, but is not a limi tation on 
the legislative power to enact l aws prohi bi t ing and 
punishing the promiscuous carrying of arms or other deadly 
weapons? The s ection is held t o dea l exclusively wi th 
the military ; individual rights are not considered. 
Section :z.. of t he Bill of Rights: 
The right to worship God a ccording t o the 
dictates of conscience shall never be infringed ; 
nor shall any person be compelled to attend o~ 
support any form of worship; nor shall any con-
t r ol or interference with the rights of conscience 
be permitted, nor any pref erence given by law to 
any religious es t a.b lisbment or m de of worship . 
No relig ious test or property qualification shall 
be required for any office of public t rust , nor 
for any vote at any election, nor shall any per -
son be incompetent to testify on account of 
religious belief. 
4 
In the case of State v. Blair 130K. 863 . (1930), 
Blair was convicted of violation of the Sunday Labor 
law by opera.ting a t heatre on Sunday . Blair charged that 
he was being deprived of his right to religious freedom 
by being comp~lled to accep t Sunday as a day of r est. 
The Court h eld that his rights were not violated and his 
religion ·was not interferred with. 
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In State !.• Raining _131K. 853 ( 1930 ), the same the-
atre was operat ed on Sunday by a bona fide Seventh Day 
Adventist. Upon arrest, the defendant char ged t hat his 
religious rights were violated since Sunday was not the 
Sabbath Day for him. The court held t hat refusing him 
the right t o operat e the theatre on Sunday had nothing 
to do with his religion and t hat such prohibition was a 
proper exercise of police power t o protect the mor als of 
the general public. 
In Feizel y. First German Soc. M,. E• Church 9K. 592 
(1872 ), the trustees, to meet stipulations of a trust, 
closed the church to a certa in minister not a cceptable 
as provided in the trust. The Court held that it would 
sit in equity to see that stipulations of the turst were 
carried out, and that if such stipulat i ons were objection-
abme to the members of the congregation, they were free 
to go elsewhere to worship. Since the members were not 
compelled to worship in the church established by t he 
trust, their rights were not infringed. The Courts will 
not int erfere with worship beyond carrying out the trust. 
In Haclmey y. Vawter 39K. 615 (1888 ), the Court 
held that an injunction may be granted to restra in the 
minority from infringing upon the rights and beliefs of 
the majority within a given church. In this case the 
new minister and a minority of t he church officers sought 
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to force music upon the congregation in the f orm of an 
organ and group singing . Such music and f orm of rorship 
was against the extablished principles of t he church 
and violated the ~i ghts of the majority. 
In Anderson y. City of Wellington 40K. 173 (1888 ), 
the Court held that a city ordinance requiring the 
authority of the mayor f or street demonstrations was 
void and that any r eligious group may parade streets or 
draw crowds together so long as such actions do not 
threat en t he public pea ce or good order of the community . 
In Billard.!• Emard.£! Education 69K. 53 (1904), 
the Court held t hat a public school t eacher who , for 
the purpose of quieting t he pupils and preparing t h em 
for the regular studies, repeats t he Lord's Prayer and 
the Twenty-third Psalm a s a morning exer cise, without 
comrnent or remark , in which all pupils are not required 
to participate, (but were required to remai n quiet and 
orderly) is not conduct i ng a f orm of religi ous wor ship 
or teaching sectarian doctrine. 
In Denton .Y.• Jones 107K. 729 (1920), t wo gr and-
mothers, one a Roman Catholic and the other a Protestant , 
were disputing over the custody of a gr anddaughter. The 
Court held that aside f r om teachings su bver s i ve of 
morality and decency , and some ot hers equally obnoxious, 
the courts have no author i t y over t hat part of a child's 
training wh ich consists of r eligious discipline, and 
in a dispute relating to custody , religious views 
afford no ground for depriving a parent of custody who 
is otherwise qualified. 
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In State y_. Monahan ?2K.492 (1905), t he Court held 
that provisions of the Kansas Bill of Rights that no 
property qualification shall be required for any office 
of public trust or f or any vote at any election , applies 
only to t hose offices and elec t ions contemplated by the 
constitut ion, and does not prevent the legislature from 
authorizing t he creation of drainage district s , the 
powers of which are t o be exercised by directors who a.re 
required to b e freeholders elected by the res ident tax-
payers. A drainage dist r ict i s who _ly the cr eation of 
t he legislature which has discretion in providing for 
its officers. 
Section il. of t he Bill of Right s: 
The liber t y of the press shal l be inviolate; and 
all persons may freely speak , wr i te or publish their 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsibl e for 
the abuse of such right; and in all civil or c~i minal 
actions for libel, t he truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury, and if it shall appear that the alleged 
libelous matter was published f or justifi able ends, 
the accused party shall be acquitted. 
In Castle!• Houston 19K. 417.(1877), a distinction 
is made between t he defense in criminal and in civil libel. 
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The Court held that i n all criminal prosecutions for 
libel, the truth of the matter charged as libelous is 
not a full and complete defense unl ess it appear s that 
the matter charged was published for public benefit ; 
or in other words, that the alleged libelous matter 
was published f or justif iable works; but in all such 
proceedings , the jury, after having received the direc-
tion of the court , shall have t he r i ght to determine, 
at t heir discretion, the law and the fact . In all 
civil actions for libel, brought by the party claiming 
to have been defamed , wh er e the defendant alleges and 
estab lishes the truth of the matter charged as defam-
atory, such de f endant is justif ied in l aw and exempt 
f rom civil respons ibility. In such ca.ses the :g.ury 
must receive and accept the direction of the court as 
the l aw. The cour t justif ied such distinction on 
grounds that wnere a publi cation is made s olely t o 
disturb the harmony and happiness of society or t o 
maliciously annoy and injure others or to cr eate mi s ery--
the interests of the public requiresome preventat i ve 
notwiths tanding the truth of t he publication . 
In Hetherington v. Sterry 28K. 173 (1882), the 
Court held that it is not necessarily a defense to an 
a ction of libel that every act charged i n the alleged 
libelous article might be done without the violation 
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of any law. I t is enough if the acts charged are auch 
as are calculated to render the party in the judgment 
of his fellows infamous, odious , or ridiculous. Here 
an article exposing a lawyer as one who deserts his client 
in the midst of a case is proper grounds f or libel. 
In Mundy I• Wight 26K. 173 (1881), the Court held 
that the truth is a full defense in any civil action 
for slander, as well as for libel. 
In State I• Mayberry 33K. 441 (1885), the Court 
held that in order that an article published in a news -
paper should be held to be libelous as t o a particular 
person, it is necessary that the language of the article 
should be such that any pe r sons seeing it should , in 
the light of surrounding cir cumstances, be able to 
under stand that it referred to such person. 
In Railway Co.~. Brown BOK. 312 (1909), the Court 
held that a st ature which requires an employer of labor, 
upon request of a discharged employee, to furnish in 
writing the t rue cause or reason f or such discharge is 
not a police regulation a.nd is an interference with the 
per sonal liberty guarnteed in the Bill of Rights . An 
employer may discharge his employee for any or f or no 
reason, so long as no contract agre ements are violated. 
In Lewis I• Publishing .92.. lllK.25? (1922 ), during 
war with Germany ( 1918.), the defendant published in 
2!1 
his newspaper an article mentioning the plaintif f's 
futule effort to procure deferred classification and 
s tated how the plaintiff had wi th the help of a friend 
gotten off the t rain enroute to a military training 
camp and then later made contradictory statements to 
the local draft board in explaining the indident. The 
Court held that here was proper grounds for an action 
in libel sunce such publication did defame the plain-
tiff and cause his friends to refer to him as a 
slacker. 
In State.!• Fiske ll?k. 69 (1924), the defendant 
charged with securing members for an organization, 
The Industrial Worl<:ers of the World, advocating class 
war between labor and capital. The defendant was con-
victed of felony, according to statute, and he charged 
violation of his constitutional r i ghts . The Court 
held that const i tional guarantees of freedom of speech 
are not violated by a statute penali zing the advacacy 
of violence in bringing about government al change. 
In State.!• Freeman 143K. 315 (1936 ), the statute 
prohibiting anonymouns publication criticizing politica l 
candidates was held valid. The defendant was brought 
to court because of a poster which charged his opponent 
for county com..missioner with f raud and bore the s i gna-
ture "friends of R. E. Freeman." The defendant declared 
that his rights were infringed and t he Bill of Rights 
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violated by the statute under whi ch he was arrested. 
The Court held that there is nothing in the s t atute 
which prevents in the slightest degree any person from 
exercising all his constitutional rights to write or 
print i nformation concerning a cand idate. The statute 
simply requires that responsib i lity f or such information 
be indicated. The s tatute does not deny liberty-- it 
requires only assumption of the responsibility of lib-
erty. 
In Eckert v. Van Pelt 69K. 3 57 (1904), the Court 
held that v,r i t ten words are actionable per~ (of them-
selves) i f they t end to render him of wh om t hey are 
written contempt ible or didiculous. A newspaper pub-
lication s t at ing that a man is a "eunu h" is actionable 
per M, and the libeled person's name need not be men-
tioned where it is evident that the statement refers t o 
him. 
In State y_. Herry ~6K. 416 (1887), the Court held 
t hat a statute pl afng upon t he defendant in a prose-
cution for l i bel the burden of s howing the the pub lica-
tion of the alleged libel was made with good motives 
before there can be an acquittal violates the Bill of 
Rights which calls for only justificable ends. Good 
motices are not a prerequisite to justification and 
acquittal. 
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In Cooper .Y.• Seaverns 81K. 267 (1909), the Court 
held that the rule of the Common Law, that s poken words 
imputing unchastity t o a femal e are not actionable 
without allegati on and proof of special damages , is 
not a part of the law of this state and is not in keep-
ing with the spirit of the l aw at the t ime. Words that 
bla cken a woman's reputation are act i onable per~. 
In Coleman .Y.• MacLennan 78K. 711 {1908), the pub-
lisher of a newspaper circulated throughout t he state 
published an art icle r eciting facts and ma ldng comments 
relat i ng to the official conduct and character of a 
state offi cer, who was a candidate fo r eelection. The 
Court held that where such a ction is f or t he sole pur-
poseof enabling the vot er s to cast their ballots more 
intelligently, and the whole thing is done in gooa. 
faith, the publicat ion is privileged , al though the 
matters contained in the article are false and are de-
r ogatory to the character of the candidate . In t his 
case the edit or had in mind the common good rather than 
malice to the candidat e and was "just if ied" in making 
such publication. 
I n Knapp .Y.• Green 123K. 550 (1927), t he Court 
held that an article published i n a newspaper concern-
ing a person named or described t herein whi ch t ends t o 
provoke him to wrath, or expose him t o :public hatr ed, 
contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the bene-
fits of public oonfidence and social inter·ro urse is 
actionable per~ if the art icle is f alse. In this 
case the article charged a postmaster and Republican 
boss of stopping at nothing to maintain control by 
their ma.chine. 
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In Depew !.• Wi chita Association £f. Credit Men 
142K. 403 (1935), where a group of credit men who are 
are not licensed lawyers were giving legal advice to 
clients, and the court held that t o prohibit such prac-
tice was not t o deprice the credit men of t heir freedom 
of speech. Such regulation was proper use of the police 
power f or protection of t he general public . 
Section ..!2_. of t he Bill of Ri ghts: 
No hereditary , emoluments, honors, or privileges 
shall ever be granted or conferred by t he stat e. 
This section has n ever been dir ectly involved in 
any case before the Court. There have been many cases 
in which charges of di scrimination and special privileges 
have been made, but t hese cases come under sections 1 
and 2 of the Bill of Rights and a.re listed in Chapter V. 
SUMivlARY 
In summary of the f oregoing cases it may be stated 
that the Supreme Court of the state of Kansas has held 
its citizens to the following principles: 
1. If one is a member of an organizationlf. he 
must abide by the rules of that organization, 
even though such rules prohibit certain rights 
of petition. (111K. 415) 
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2. One has a right to assemble and t o petition 
the legislature fo r desired legislation, though 
such legislation be bitterly opposed by others . 
(122K. '701) 
3. The state has a right to ena ct l aws prohibi t -
i ng and ·punishing t he promiscuous carrying of 
a r ms. ('72K. 230) 
4. One may be restrai. ned from operating a theatre 
on Sunday and his religious f reedom i.s not vio-
l ated. (130K. 863) 
5. Property left in trust for religious purposes 
must be used as s t ipul a ted in the trust . (9K. 592 ) 
6. An injunction may be pr operl y granted to re-
strain a mi nority from infringing upon the beliefs 
of the ma jority within a given church. (39K. 615) 
'7. One may demonstrate and parade in :publi c with-
out authority f rom city offi c i als, so long as the 
public peace and good order are threatened. 
(40K. 1?3) 
8. A teacher may r ead to here pupils the Lord's 
Pra:1rer and the Twenty-third Psalm without c omment 
or remark. ( 69K. 53) 
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9. The courts have no authority over that part 
of a child's training which consists of religious 
discipline. (107K. 720) 
10. Property qualifications may be requir ed for 
directors and for electors in drainage districts . 
(72K. 492) 
.11. The truth of the matter charged a s l i belous 
is a f ull and comp l ete det ense in civil livel but 
not in criminal libel. (19K . 417) 
12. That every act charged in an alleged libelous 
article might be done without violation of any 
law, is not necessarily a def ense to an a.ctoin 
in libel. (28K. 174 ) 
14. The truth is a full defense in any civil 
action for slander. (26K. 173) 
15. For an article to be held libelous is a 
particular person, it must be clear that the art-
icle refers to him. (33K. 441) 
16. To require an employer to g ive in writ ing , 
upon request of a discharged employee, the reason 
f or the discharge i s a violation of the employer's 
rights. (BOK. 312) 
l?. Making remarks which would cause a person t o 
be called, in time of war, a slacker, is grounds 
f or libel. (lllK. 257) 
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CHAPI'ER V 
EQUAL RIGHTS; POLITICAL POWER; POWERS RETAINED BY THE 
PEOPLE 
This chapter includes sections 1, 2, and 20 of the 
Bill of Rights. Sections 1 and 2 , providing for equal 
rights and prohibiting discrimination, have been subj ects 
for much litigation before the Supreme Court. The s e t wo 
sections are so closely related t hat many s i ngle cases 
have been carried to the Court on t he grounds t hat both 
sections are violated. That thes e s ections ,provide a 
lasting basis for litigation i s evi dent in that eighteen 
cases, directly involving either or both s e·ctions , have 
been before t he Supreme Court s i n~e 1930. Secti on 20 , 
reserving to the people al l power s not delegat ed , has 
been directly involved in five cl ear- cut cases and has 
been mentioned i n numerous others . 
Section 1· of t he Bi ll of Ri ght s : 
"all men are poss essed of equal and 
inalienable natural rights, among whi ch are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . " 
In Atchi s on Street RailWsY Co. y. Mo. Pac. Railway 
Co. 31K. 660 (1884), the Court held t hat the city of 
Atchison did not violate the Bill of rights in granting 
special privilege to a street rai lway company to permit 
such company- to occupy the streets with its tracks. 
The legislature has power to authorize municipal 
coporations to issue franchises granting privileges. 
In Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fey. Mathews 
58K. 447(1897), the Court held that a statute pro-
viding that a plaintiff might collect attorney's 
fees, in addition to fire damages, from a railroad 
company, was in the nature of a police regulation 
desinged to enforce care on the part of the railroad 
and was not intended to place a burden on railroad 
corporations that private persons are not required to 
bea~. 
In Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fey. Clark 60K. 
826 (1899), the Court held t hat a special fire tax 
levied on railroad property for the exclusive benefit 
of other property was discrimination against one tax-
payer in favor of another and was a denial of equal 
protection of the law. 
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In Cit.y of Topeka~- Raynor 61K.10 (1900), the 
Court held that an ordinance providi ng , "All places 
where persons are permitted to resort for the purpose 
of drinking intoxicating liquors as a beverage are 
common nuisances" is not repugna.Jbt to the constitu-
tional provision that all mena are possessed of equal 
and inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. 
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In City of Leavenworth y. Water Co. 62K.643 
(1901), a water company complained that a statute 
forcing it to file itemized statements of income and 
expense accounts with the city clerk was an unjusti-
fiable scrutiny of private affairs. The Court held 
that the corporation was formed for public service and 
might be con trolled by the state in the interest of the 
public vm ich it agreed to serve. The company had no 
vested right to withhold from the public information as 
to its operations under the very franchise which the 
public bad conferred upon it. 
In State y. Wilcox 64K. 789 (1902 ), the defnedent 
was convicted of practicing medicine without a license, 
and he answered with the charg e that such action operated 
to exclude some persons from following their chosen 
professions and was arbitrary discrimination. The court 
held that such law was proper to protect the people from 
ignorance and incapacity, as well as from deception and 
fraud, and was proper use of police power of the state. 
In Bijick Co. y. Perry 69K . 297(1904), the court held 
that a statute forbiddipg discharge of an employee for 
joining a labor union was unconstitutional as a violation 
of the protection of life, liberty, and proper t y . One 
citizen can not be compelled to employ another anymore 
than one can be compelled to work for another against his 
will. 
In Ratcliff y. Stockyards Co. 74K.1(1906), the 
stockyards company charged tr..at a statute regulating 
their handling r ates deprived them of their right to 
make contracts as they chose and amounted to taking 
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of their property . Court held that rates fixed by 
statute were reasonable and that leg islature has power 
to fix su ch rates for a public-service corporation so 
long as such rates are not so unreasonable as to destroy 
the value of; tpe- property. 
In Schaake y. Dolley 85K.598 (1911), the State 
Charter Board , acting under statute, refused to cha rter a 
fifth bank for the city of Abilene and the plaintiff 
charged violation of equal rights. The Court held that 
while the choosing of an occupat ion is considered an 
inalienable r i ght , it is not absolute, and it is proper for 
t he sovereign power to interfere if t h a t right becomes 
detrimental t o the common good. Banking is a business in-
timately related to the public welfare and properly comes 
under the police power. In this case the State Charter 
Board f elt t hat there was not business to justify a fifth 
bank in the city and such bank would have weakened all . 
In State y . Coppage 87K. 752 (1912), the_ Court r e-
versed its philosophy as expounded eight years earli er .in 
69K.297, and held tha t an employer has no right to domi-
nate life or int erfere with the lib erty of the employee 
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in matters that do not lessen or deteriorate such 
employee's service. A man mi ght be f i red for drinking 
but not for relig ion or f or l ab or union membership .(This 
decision was reversed in 236 u. s . 1 ) 
In Stat e y. Cline 91K.416 (1914 ), the state i nheri-
tance tax was challenged as a violation of equal protection 
and benefit of t he people. The Court held tha t the in-
heritance tax was a tax on ~ne succession rather than on 
~he property and that the right to ~ake property by ctevise 
or ctescent is the creat~re of the law, and not a natural 
right. The authority that confers the privilege of inheri-
tance may impose conditions and may discriminate between 
relatives. 
In State y. Reaser 93K.628 .( 1915), the superintendent 
of a coal mining company was convicted of failure to provide 
proper bathing facilities for employees, as required by 
law. Defendent charged discriminat i on since other mines 
(zinc, salt, lead, etc.) did not have to meet the regula-
tions. The Court held that the law applied toall mines 
of a designated class and was not a violation of the Bill 
of Rights because not applicable to other classes of rrutnes . 
In Drainage -District y. Mo. Pac. Railroad 99K.188 . 
(1916), a drainage district ordered a r ailroad bridge 
destroy~d as a flood hazard. The Court held that such an 
order was constitutional so long a s it was reasonable, 
and that here it was done to protect the lires and 
homes of the people. The grant of power to the board 
was never interpreted as a privilege to injure the 
public. 
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In State y. Wilson lOlK.789.(1917), the Court held 
that under its police power the state may place a pro-
hibitory tax on an occupation whi ch is de emed injurious 
or offensive to t he public, and the use of trading stamps 
is deceptive and objectional enough to be prohibited by 
heavy tax. 
In In re Josie Dunkerton 104K.481.(1919 ) , the 
petitioner charged that a statute providing that the 
board of Admi nistration mi ght parole women aged 18 to 
to 25, but that older ones must erve the minimum term 
in the State Industrial Farm, denied equal prot ecti on 
of the law to women over 25 years of age . The Court 
held that statute was constitutional; t hat even though 
the Board of Administration could not parole older women, 
the district court still might do so; and that the legis-
lature had a right to make a difference i n the treatment 
of different classes of cr iminals. 
In Chamberlain y. Mo. Pac. Railroad 107K.341(1920) , 
action was brought to compel a railroad company to con-
struct, at its own expense, a private c-rmssing on property 
through which it had years before bought and paid for a 
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right-of-way. The Court held that such compulsion 
was discrimination against the railroad and deprived 
it of it s property without compensation. The railroad 
company could have been compelled to construct a public 
but not a private one~ 
In City of Wichita y:. Walkow llOK.127. (1921), the 
Court held t hat for the sake of enforcement of criminal 
law and protection of the public in general , it was pro-
per, under the police power, for a city to pass an 
ordinance requiring pawndealers to keep records, signa-
tures, and fingerprints of those selling articles to 
them. Such ordinance did not deny equal protection of 
the l aw. 
In Railroad and Light Co. v . Court of Industrial 
Relations 113K. 217 (1923), the Court held tha t t he state 
may intrude with polic e power to abrogate existing con-
tracts. Contracts co r_c erning rates for electric energy 
to be supplied by an electric power company to a street 
railroad are subject to impairment or nullification under 
an order of the public utilities commission when the 
performance of those contracts at the agreed scedules of 
rates so materially diminish or adversely affect the 
revenues of the power company that the other customers 
of the power company have to bear some portion of the 
burden resulting from such contracts, or are otherwise 
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discriminated against on account of such contracts. 
In ~ayfield y. Board gf Education of Salina 118K. 
138 (1925), the defendents charged that the erection of 
a school house next to their property would depreciate 
the value thereof because of the added noise, trespasses, 
etc., and that they would thus be injured without any 
compensation and would be denied equal protection of the 
law. The Court held that acts done on proper exercise 
of governmental powers, not directly encroaching up on 
private property, although their consequences may i mpair 
its use, do. not constitute a taking of property and do 
not entitle the o~mer to compensation under the Bill of 
Rights. 
In In re Casebier 129K.853 . (1930), the petitioner 
charged that a statute providing for the disburs ement 
of lawyers convict.ed of felony or mis.demeanor i nvolving 
moral turpitude was discriminating since the l aw brings 
upon an attorney cons equences wh ich apply to no other 
citizen, not even to other prof es s ional men. Court hel d 
that the right to practice law was not a property right, 
but a privilege conferred by the state and t hat t he 
statute simply took away t h is privileg e which other in-
dividuals did not even possess and did not vi~iate equal 
protection of the law. 
In Capital Gas and Electric Co. v. Boynton 137K.717(1933 ) 
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the Court held that the statute prohibiting public 
utilities companies from selling appliances was uncon-
stitutional. With no feature of public welfare actually 
involved, the deprivation of the utilities companies of 
an implied power and privilege :incidental to their gen-
w , eral business was unreasonable, arbitral"Y, and oppres sive, 
and deprived this p articular class of equal protection of 
the law. 
In Smithy. Steinrauf 140K.407(1934), the Court held 
that the interest of an owner in cats kep t in his r esidence 
for pleasure is a property interest, not base nor i mper-
fect nor qualified, but a complete and absolute property 
interest, and that an ordinance limiting the number of 
cats which an owner may keep in his residence to f ive, 
without regard to distinctiveness of character of t he 
animais, to purpose, or to manner and consequ ences of 
keeping, is void. A p erson may enjoy private property so 
long as it doesn't detract from the general welfare. 
In State y. Wyandotte Co. Commissioners 140K.744 
(1934), the Court held that the Kansas statute, appli-
cable only to Wyandotte County, authorizing the calling 
of an annual grand jury with special costs taxed against 
persons convicted on indictments found by such grand jury, 
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution. 
Such act discriminated against those convicted of crimes 
in Wyandotte county. 
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-~ In Ash v. Gibson 145K. 825 . ( 1937), the defendent 
protested that his right to equal protection of the 
law was violated by a city ordinance forbiding oil 
transport trucks of over 600 gallon capacity to use 
eertain streets. The Court held that such oil trucks 
had no inherent right to use the streets, that such 
transports could use other streets of the city , and 
that because of the potential danger of fire from 
collision the regulation was proper under p olice p ower. 
In Brown y. City of Topeka 146K. 974.(1938), a 
group of Topeka property owners protested agai m t chang-
ing the name of a street , claiming that they had a 
v ested property right in the name of the street, of 
which the ordinance giving power to change deprived t hem 
without due process and comp ensation. The Court held 
that the name of a street is not a property right and 
that there was no peprivation. 
In Johnson v. Reno Co. Commissioners 147K.211(1938 ), 
the Court held that denial by the township board of a 
license fvr sale of 3. 2 beer does not violate the Bi l l 
of Rights. such denial of a license is not a denia l of 
life, liberty, or pursuit of happiness. Application for 
a license is a request f or a privilege under a regula-
tory police measure and is not a right. 
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In Hushaw y. Kansas Farmers Union Royality Co. 
149K.64(1939), the Court held tha t a stature, p roviding 
that instruments conveying mineral rights are void unless 
recorded within ninety days after execution and i f not 
listed for t axati on, did not violate the Bill of Rights. 
This was n o t the forfeiture of a ves t ed title, but a con-
dition precedent to the vesting of title in the transferee. 
In Kern y. Newton City Commiss i oners 147K.471(1938) , 
the Court held that the plaintiff a colored citizen and 
tax-payer of Newton , ha s the individual ri t ht to initiate 
proceedings in mandamus to compel the g overrui.ng off icials 
of the city to admit him to privileges of the city ' s 
swimming poot constructed by the municipality at public 
expense. The legislature alone can provide for segre-
gation of races. 
In Carolene Products y. Mohler 152K. 4 .(1940) the 
Carolene Products company charged that they were being 
discriminated against by the Kansas "fi lled- milk" statute 
which prohibited the sale of milk products contain~ng any 
added element other than milk fat. They pointed out that 
every ingredient in their product was sold in other forms 
in the state. Facts in the cas e showed that "Carolene" 
was being bought by the public as genuine evaporated 
milk, and the Court held that this afforded grounds for 
prohibiting the product in the interests of the public. 
In Railroad Co. y. Public Utilities Commission 
llSK.417(1934), the Court held that a statute which 
subjected to taxation lands dedicated to public use 
as a cenetery where the ovvnership of the land is 
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held by a corporation, while all other cemetery lands, 
the title to which is held by an individual, are 
exempted fuom taxation, violates the provisions of the 
state constitution which guarantee equal protection of 
the law. 
In Hair y. City of Rumbolt l33K.C67 (1931), the 
plaintiff, ·vVho am...~ufactured bakery products at Iola and 
sold them to the merchants in Rumbolt, ogjected to a 
Rumbolt city ordinance which provided for a license of 
$1 per day or $10 per y ear for persons operating bakeries 
within the city and selling the products, and $1.50 per 
day or $120 per year for persons selling bakery products 
therein and not owning or operating a bakery and having 
·no bona fide place of business within the city. The court 
held that such ordinance violated obth the federal and the 
state constitution. 
In Swope y. State 145K.928(1937), the Court held 
that the refusal of an expert witness to testify in court 
without extra compensation is proper grounds for contempt 
of court and may be punished as such. A physician may not 
refuse to testify on grounds that his rights are being 
violated. 
46 
In Osborn y. Russell 64K.507(1902), the Court held 
that a board of education, at a time vv.hen the disease 
of smallpox does not exist in or near the city, has no 
authority to deny a child of sen ool age , re sident there-
in, admission into the public schools because such child 
has not been vaccinated. 
In State,~ rel.,y. Jackson 139K.744(1934), the 
Court held that a sheriff is properly removed from office 
for beating and mistreating prisoners in violation of 
their constitutional guarantees. 
In State y. Sherow 87K. 235 (1912), the Court held 
that a statute authorizing township boards to grant li-
censes for billard halls, poot halls, and bowling alleys 
at their discretion is valid exercise of police power . 
In In re Skinner 136K.879 (1933), the p etitioner ------
charg ed that judges were discriminating in discovering 
past convictions and thus bringing defnedents under the 
Kansas habitual criminal law. It was contended that i n 
some cases judges made little if any attempt to discover 
past coDVictions and that defendents thereby escaped 
the penalties of the law. The Court held that the law 
was constitutional and that so long as judges wer e not 
willfully, arbitrarily, deliberately, and intentionally 
depriving defendants of· equal protection of the law it 
was within the Bill of Rights. 
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I n Claflin ~· \l\ryandotte Co.81K. 57 (1909 ) , it was 
hel d t ha t a statute pr ov iding that certain public off·icers 
shall not be entitled to witness fees in certa in cases , 
doe s not deprive the off icers of equal protection of the 
law, Such condition is a part of the privilege accepted 
with the public office and such condition may be swept 
away by resignation f r om office . 
In Reynolds~· Board of Education 66K. 672 (1903 ), i t 
was held t hat a statute providi ng t hat boar ds of educa~ 
tion shall have power to organi ze and mai ntain separate 
schools for t he education of white and colored childr en 
does not deny equa l protection of law. 
In In~ Gardner 84K. 264 (1911), t he Court held that 
the stat ute providi ng that offi cers and men of the Kansas 
National Guard shall , when in per f ormance of mi l i tary 
service , be transport ed on a l l r ailroads of the stat e at 
r educed r ates denie s to r ailr oad compani es l,he equal pro-
tection of the l aw. In time of ext r eme emergency and 
peril , the r ai l r oads coul d even be sei zed by the state , 
but the a ct in questi on doe s not specifi cal l y refer t o 
such occasions . 
I n Wi nters ~ · Myers 92K. 414 (1914 ), it was hel d that 
the titl e to is l ands formed i n navigable streams s i nce the 
admission of Kansas into the Un i on i s held by the state 
fo r the benefi t of all the people . For t he leg islat ur e 
to relinquish title to such islands to owners of shore l ands 
-~ 
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without compensatmon, where no public benefit will 
result, is unconstitutional. It is like compelling 
a contribution from all for the benefit of the few and 
here the equal rights clause is called on to protect 
the many f r om the few ir:stead of the usual v i ce versa. 
In State y. Heitman 105K.139 (1919), the defendant 
charged v i olation of equal protection of the law i n the 
statute providing t hat a woman convicted of a mis de-
meanor be sentenced to the state farm f or women f or an 
undetermined period, with a maxi mum l imit, while a man 
convicted of t he same misdemeanor is sentenced, under 
the general l aw , to the county jail f or a definite period 
within the same maximum limit . The Court held that there 
is room for difference in t reatment of different classes 
of criminals and that equal protection is secured if the 
law op erate s in t he same way on all who belong to the 
same cla s s . 
In~ y. City of Wichita 113K.153(1923), the 
Court held that laws authorizing cities to establish 
districts or zones within t heir corporate limits and to 
regulate the use of property and the construction of 
buildings therein, are not unconstitutional, but are pro-
per us e of police p ower in the i nterest of the general 
publ ic . 
In Goodrich y. Mitchell 68K.765 (1904), the Court 
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held that a statute g iving peeference to those who have 
served in the army and navy in appointment to off ice is 
constitutional and not ynjust discrimination. The Court 
argued tha t these men because of experience and army 
training may be co~sidered better fitted for public ser-
vice than the g:eneral public . 
In St ate y. Creditor 44K. 565(1890), the Court held 
that a statute requiring regu lation and licensing of 
dent istry was cons ti tutional~;_and proper use of police 
for the common good . 
In City of Cherokee y . Fox 34K. 16(1885), the Court 
held that an ordinance providing license for professional 
peddlers wa s not void for reason that is was class legis-
l ati on or discrimination . The peddler could have sold 
goods as a merchant of the city wi thru t paying such 
l icense fee . 
In State y . Mohler 98K. 465(1916), it was held that 
a l aw requi r ing all commission merchants who sell farm 
produce f or r esale t o hold a license issued by the State 
Board of Agricul t ure and to g ive bond to insure fair 
dealing with t.heir consi gnors, i s constitu-c,ional and is 
not discriminatory. It is proper use of police power 
to protect a l a rge number of consignors ana the c~ass i -
fication is reasonable and broad. 
In Balch y. Glenn 85K. 735 (1911), ~ne Court held 
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that a statute autnorizing the destruction of trees 
in an attempt to exterminate San Jose scale ana other 
orcnard pests ana charging of expense of such destruction 
against U1e property is valid use of police power for 
protection of the public welfare. 
Section g. of the Bill of Rights: 
"All political power is inherent in the people, 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority, and are instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit. No special privileges 
or immunities shall ever be granted by the legis-
lature, wh ich may not be altered, revoked or 
repealed by the same body; and this power shall 
be exercised by no other tribunal or agency." 
In Water Co. y. City of Columbus 48K.99 (1892), the 
Court held that authorities of a city coul~ bind their 
successors by contracting for 21 years with a water com-
pany, and that such contract could be terminated or 
changed only under the police p ower of the state . 
In State y. City of Hutchinson 93K.405 (1914), the 
Court held t hat the initiative and referendum law granted 
no special privileges or immunities to those circulating 
·and agitating petition. Any citizen has an equal right 
and opportunity to do the same. 
In O'Neal y. Harrison 96K. 339 (1915), it was held 
that a city may grant an exclusive right to the highest 
bidder to remove all gar bage without v i ola tion of t he 
Bill of Rights. The last clause of section 2 was 
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interpreted to refer solely to political prrvileges 
and not to privileges relating to property rights. 
Also the control of garbage removal is proper exercise 
of police power . 
In State y. City of Wichita lOOK.399 (1917), the 
Court held tha t an act authorizing a city to adopt a 
city manager plan is not a violation of section 2 of 
the Bill of Ri ghts in that it is a delegation of legis-
lative powers . 
In Rohr v. City of Leavenworth lOlK. 222(1917), the 
Court held that a statute giving to cities t he power to 
pssess abutting property for repa ir of s treets as well 
as for paving of streets is not a violat ion of the Bill 
of Ri ghts. 
In Jamison v. Flanner 116K.116 (1924 ), ~a sheriff 
refused to r elease a prisoner, pardoned by the Governor, 
on the grounds that the Governor had f ailed to comply 
with the law by notifying the county attorney and the 
district j udge and by publishing notice fo such pardon 
30 days in advance. The Court held that t he pardoning 
power is not inherent in t he executive, though it has 
a long history; it is prop er for the legislature to 
pass l aws regillating t h is power, and unless t he governor 
meets t hese legislative requirements the pardon or com-
mutation is illegal. 
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In Farmers Co-op G. ands . Co. y . Chicago, & L_ 
and]:. Railroad Co. 139K.677 (1934~,, the Court held that 
a lease in effect between a railroad company and an ele-
vator company in which the elevator company compl ains 
it is being char g ed hgigher rental than other similar 
elevator companie s cannot be changed by the Public Ser-
vice Commission acting for the state, unless such contract 
is prejudicial to and discriminating against the public 
or otherwise obstructs the state's authority to make l aws 
and regulations reasonably n ecessary for the g eneral 
welfare . 
In Depew y. Wichita Association of Credit Men 142K. 
403 (1935) , t t e Association was helpi ng cl i ents i n col-
lection of debts and was off r ing what amounted to legal 
advise and a id, 
licensed l awyers . 
though its members were not qualif ied or 
The Court held that denial of such 
privilege to the Association was not vio l a t i on of the Bi ll 
of Ri ghts. 
In Lemons y Noller 144K. 813 (1936), statutes pro-
viding for absentee voting were char ged to b e discrimi n-
atory in that they made it p ossible for phy sically 
disabled persons to vote who could not vote were they 
within the state. Were the s e disabled voters within the 
state it would be necessar y for t hem to be pres ent at 
the polls in order to vote. The Court held t hat voting 
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is a privilege rather than a right and t hat t he 
legislature is nowhere in the constitution prohibited 
from cla ssifying voters and t hat no one was herein de-
prived of his politica l r i ghts . 
In Winckler Oil Co. y. Anderson 104K.l (1919) , 
the court held that a statute making it unlawful to drill 
or operate oil or gas wells within 100 feet of t he right 
of way of steam or electric railway lines do es not con-
travene provisions of the Bill of Ri ghts and i s proper 
exercise of police power. 
In Produce Co. y. City of Wichita 112K. 28 (1922) , 
it was he l d that a city ordinance levy i ng a license tax 
on all trad~s, bus i nesses, and occupations in the city, 
in which or incident to whoch del ivery Wagons or Trucks 
are employed , is not necessary void for ar bi t rariness 
of classification or unl awful discrimi nation . Trucks 
are nearly universal accessories to city trades , and 
the ab ove classificat ion is broad . No t ax or license can 
be entirely equal and perf ect. 
In State y. Topeka 36K.76 (1886 ), t he Court held 
that l abor is property, but i s not taken without compen-
s ation where a citizen is required to work on the s t reets. 
Good roads and streets are sufficient compensation, ana 
labor required in this case may be cons i dered a s an 
assessment tax. 
Section 20. of ~he Bill of Ri ghts: 
"Thi s enumerati on of rights shal.l not be 
construed to i mpair or deny others retained 
by the people; and all p owers not herein dele-
gated rema in with the people." 
In Lemons~- Noller 144K. 813 (1936 ), i n which 
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the statutes providing t ·or absentee voting were 
challenged a s being unconstitutional, the Court stated 
that al.1 powers not delegat ed rema in wi-c,h _ue p eople 
and since the people act through the legislature , the 
legislature may do whatever is not directly or implicit-
ly denied in the constitution. 
In Coleman y. Newby ?K. 82 (1871), t he plainti f f 
appealed from a justice of the peace court to the di s -
trict court in the regular manner, except f or a ru.1e 
adopted by the Supreme Court that notice in writing 
·must be g iven of the appeal. This rule was not an act 
of the leg islatur e nor a rule of t he district count 
but it was a rule of the Supreme Court, ado ted by t he 
Supreme Court for the government of t he di str ict counts . 
The plaintiff char g ed t hat the Supreme Court had no power 
to make such a rule. The Court held in t his case t hat 
the legislature can not delegate legislative power to 
the judiciary as was done her e . The leg islat ure can 
enact general provi s ions for the di s t rict courts and 
allow t he district courts to use their discretion in 
filling up details; but they can not enact general 
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provisions for the district courts an d authorize the 
Supreme Court, or any other body or per s on, except the 
district courts to fill in the details. 
In Wright y. Noell 16K. 601 (1876) , the pl aintiff 
charged 1.,hat a woman was ineligible t o the office of 
county superintendent in the state of Kansas . The 
Court held that powers of the -people are limited only 
by absolute justice and t he constitution , and t hat in 
this case election of a woman to the above office 
violat ed neither. As the people, wi th respect to 
certain offices, have seen f it _by express constitutional 
provisi ons to re strict their f reedom of choice, it is a 
fair infe rence that, where t he constitution is silent, 
t h ey intended no restricti on . 
In Ratcliff y. Stockyar ds 74K 1 (1906 , the Court 
held tha t an act of t he leg i s l ature regul ating stock-
yards does not conflich with the constitution i n that 
the power to ass the act is not expressl y delegated t o 
the legislature . The legislature repr esents the people 
of the state, and t here are no limits upon the ·ower 
which the people may exercise, except such as may be 
found in the constitution itself, or in the federal con-
stitution. 
In Johnson v. Reno County Commissioners 147K. 211 
(1938), previously cited, the Court held t hat a s tatute 
leaving to the discretion of the township board 
the issuance of beer licenses within the tovmship 
is not in violation of section 20 of the Bill of 
Rights. The legistature i s not restricted by the 
constitution in regul a tion of alcoholic b everages, 
and no individual ha s any enforceable right to a 
permit to sell liquor. 
Sill/ffitT.ARY 
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In summary of the foregoing cases it may be 
stated that the Supreme Court of the St ate of Kansas 
has held its citizens to the following principles: 
1. Equal rights of citizens are not violated 
when a city extends a franchise granting 
special privileges. ( 31K. 660 ) 
2 . As a police regulation railroads may be 
required to pay attorney's f ees of t hose 
bringing suit against ehem. (58K. 447) 
3. A special f ire tax may not be levied on 
railroads for the exclus ive b enefit of' others. 
(60K. 826) 
4 . All places where persons resort to drink may 
properly .be considered common nuisances.( 61K. 10) 
5. Public corporations can not withhold their 
accounts and records from public officials. 
(62K. 643 ) 
6 . It is proper police regulation t o require 
that physi cians shall be licensed . (64K. 789 ) 
7. In 1904 the Court held that an employee 
could be discharged for j oini ng a labor union, 
but in 1912 reversed itself and held to the 
contrary . (69K . 297 and 87K. 752) 
8 . The state may fix rates for a stockya r ds 
company . ('!4K. 1) 
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9 . The state may refuse to char t er an additi onal 
bank in a city. (85K. 598 ) 
16. The state may discriminate bet ween r elatives 
in i mposing an i nheritance tax. (91K. 416) 
11. The state may p l ace regulat i ons on coal mi nes 
from which other ki nds of mine s are exempt . 
(93K. 628 ) 
12 . A drainage distriet board may order a r ai l -
r oad br idge destroyed and r epl a ced by a larger 
one. (99K. 188 ) 
13. The state may pla c e a prohibitory tax on the 
use of trading stamp s. (101K . 789) 
14. The leg i s l ature may differentiate i n the 
trea t ment required for different types of criminals. 
( 104K. 481) 
15. a railroad company cannot be compelled to 
construct a private crossing at its own expense . 
(lO?K.341) 
16. Under police power a pawndealer may be 
required to keep records and fingerprints . 
(llOK. 127) 
17. The state may abrogate contracts between 
utility companies. (113K. 217) 
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18. A person cannot collect damages for indirect 
impairment of property as a consequence of public 
construction. (118K. 138) 
19. The right to -practice law is a privilege 
which the state may give or take away. (129 K. 853) 
20. Public utility companies may not be prohibited 
from selling appliances . (137K. 717) 
21. An owner may keep as many cats as he likes so 
_long as he keeps them at home. (140K. 407) 
22. One county of the state may not i mpose penalties 
for crime which other countie s do not impose .(140K. 
744) 
23. A city may forbid the us e of its streets to 
oil trucks exclusively. (145K. 825) 
24. A city may change the name of a street against 
the protests of certain property o'WD.ers. (146K. 974) 
25. License for the sale of beer is privilege to 
be granted by the state and not an individual right. 
(147K. 211) 
26 . The state may void property titles unless 
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certain conditions of transfer are met. (149K. 64) 
27. A negro has a legal right to privileges of a 
swimming pool at public expense. (147K. 471) 
28. Food products, even though they contain whole-
some ingredients, may be prohibited i n interests 
of the public. (152K. 4) 
29. Ra ilroads may be compelled to maintain cattle 
guards at farm crossings. (115K. 545) 
30 . Corporate ovmed cemeteries may not be taxed 
while all other cemeteries are tax free . (139K. 
417) 
31. A bakert"' from within a city but selling pro-
ducts through the city merchants cannot be taxed 
. heavier than bakers of the city. (133K. 67) 
32. An expert witness can be compelled to testify 
at the ordinary rate of compensation. (145K. 928) 
33. In time of no epidemic, a child cannot be 
expelled from school because of ref usal to be 
vaccinated. (64K. 507) 
34. A sheriff may be removed from office for 
mistreating prisoners. (139K. 744) 
35. State may authorize township boards to license 
billard halls at their discretion. (87K. 235) 
36. Under the habitual criminal law, it is up 
to the judge to discover past convictions of the 
defendant . (136K. 879) 
37. Certain public officers may be deprived 
of regular witness fees . (81K. 57) 
38 . Separate schools may be maintained for 
-fhite and colored children without violating 
equal rights . (66K. 672) 
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39 . Ra ilroads cannot be required to give reduced 
rates to national guardsmen except in times of 
emergency . (84K. 264) 
40. Islands f er med in navigable streams are 
public property and cannot be given to individuals . 
(92K. 414) 
41. Women may be given a different sentence than 
. men for the same criminal offense. (106K. 139 ) 
42. A city can regulate t he use of private pro-
perty through zoning ordinances . (113K. 153) 
43 . Army and navy men may be given preference in 
appointment to public office . · (68K. 765) 
44. Dentists may be licensed and regulated. (44K 
565) 
45. A city· may require a special license for 
professional peddlers. (34K. 16) 
46. Farm prodqce comission merchants m~y be re-
quired to have a special license. (98K. 465) 
47. To control orchard disease, one's trees may be 
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destroyed and the expen9e of such act charged to 
the property. (85K. 735). 
48. City authorities may bind their successors 
with long time franchises to utility companies. 
(48K. 99) 
49. The initiative and referendum laws grant no 
privileges or immunities. (93K. 405) 
50. A city may grm t an exclusive right to the 
high bidder to remove city garbage . ( 96K . 339) 
51. A city manager form of government is not a 
delegation of legislative powers. (100K. 399) 
52. The power of pardon is not inferent in the 
executive and may be regulated by the people 
through the legislature. (116K. 116) 
53. A contract between an elevator company and 
a railroad company cannot be abrogated unless 
it adversely affects the general wel fare. 
(139K. 677) 
54. Non-lawyers may be denied the right t o give 
legal counsel. (142K. 4021 
55. Voting is a privilege rather than a right 
and may be regula ted by the legislature even to 
classifying voters. (144K. 813) 
56. State may prohibit ail wells near railroad 
lines. (104K. 1) 
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57. Taxing all trades in which delivery trucks 
are used is not unlawful discrimination. (112K.28 ) 
58. Citizen is not deprived of property without 
compensation by being required to labor on the 
streets. (36K. 76) 
59. Since the people act through the legislature, 
~hat body may do whatever is not prohibited by 
the constituti on. (144K. 813) 
60. The legislature cannot delegate legislative 
powers to the judiciary. (7K. 82) 
61 . Neither absolute justice non the constitution 
render a woman ineligible for the office of count y 
superintendent. (16K. 601) 
62. Acts of the legislat ure are limited only by 
the state and federal constitution~. (74K. 1) 
63. The legislature acting for the people is not 
restricted by the constitution from regulation 
of beer. (147K. 211) 
CHAPTER VI 
TR.Ai.~SPORTATION AND CORRUPTION OF BLOOD;TREASON ; 
SOLDIERS ; SEARCH A.T'iID SEIZURES ; IMPRI SOJ\ll'J1ENT FOR 
DEBT; PROPERTY RIGHTS 
This chapter includes sections 12, 13 , 14, 15, 
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16, and 17 of the Bill of Rights. Section 12 , pro-
hibiting corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate, 
has twice been clearly involved in cases before the 
Supreme Court. Sections 13 and 14, dealing with treason 
and with the quartering of soldiers, are of such nature 
as not likely t o be i nvolved i n litigation in a state 
that h as for the most part rema ined at peace. Nei ther 
of the s e two sect ions has ever be en before the Court . 
Section 15, dealing with search and sei zure, plays a 
part in every arrest and ha.son a number of occasions 
been brought before the Supreme Court. Section 16, per-
mitting imprisonment f'or debt only in case of fraud, 
has been directly i nvolved in nine cas es, none of them 
in recent years. Section 17, originally providing that 
in property rights there should be no distinction between 
aliens and citizens, was amended by the people at the 
election of 1888 to permit distinction between citizens 
and aliens, but t o forbid it between citizens of 
Kansas and ci t izens of other s t at es. This section has 
been involved in a number of ca.ses before the Court. 
Section 12. of the Bill of Rights: 
"No person shall be transported from the 
state for any offense committed within the s ame, 
and no conviction within th e stat e shall work a 
corruption of blood or a forf eiture of es t at e ." 
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In state y. Snyder 34K. 425 (1885), the Court held 
that the section of the prohibitory liquor l aw whi ch 
provides that the judgment f or fine an d costs for 
violation of that l aw shall be a li en upon t he premi s es 
where the intoxicating liquors were s old (even where 
such premises are the propert y of other s and are merely 
leased to the viola tor), does no t violate the Bill of 
Ri ghts by i nf licting forf eiture of estate . The liability 
created by the statu:be is not in th e nature of a f or-
feiture, and the fine and costs are not imposed upon 
the owner of t he premises, but are i mposed upon the 
person who v i olated the l aw ; and the owner of the premises 
is simply made a surety for t heir payment . 
In Hamblin v. Merchant 103K. 508 (1918 ), the Court 
held that a statute providing that the property of a 
deceased owner shall not go to the person who t ook t h e 
owner's l i fe does not violate the Bill of Rights by 
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infl i cting forfeiture of esta te. The legislature 
has entire control of the mat ter of devolution of 
property on the death of the owner. When the fact is 
ascertained in a criminal prosecution that the des-
cendant has murdered the property ovvner , the property 
is not then taken f rom the person who would inherit, 
but it is then determined that t he person has not in-
herited and has not acquired any interest in the pro-
perty. No property is taken from the convicted person 
and there is no forfeiture. (previous to the enactment 
of the statute questi oned in this case , i t was he ld 
in McAllaster!.• Fair 72K. 533 (1906) that a. husband 
who murdered his wife for the purpose of acquiring h~ 
property could not be restrained from such i nher itance} 
Section 13 of the Bill of Rights: 
"Treason shall consist only of l evying war 
against the state, adhering to its enemies, or 
giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be 
convict ed of treason unless on the evidence of 
two witnesses to the overt a.ct, or confession 
open court." 
This section o:e the Bill of Ri ghts has never been 
involved in any case before the Supreme Court of the 
state. 
Section 14. of the Bill of Rights: 
"No soldier shall, in time of peace , be 
quartered in any hous e without the consent of 
the occupant, nor in time of war, exc ept as 
prescribed by law." 
This section of the Bill of Rights has never 
been involved in any case before the Supreme Court 
of the state. 
Section 15. of the Bill of Rights: 
"The right of t he people to be secure i n 
their persons and property against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall be inviolate; an d 
no warrant shall issue but on probable cause , 
supported by oath or affirmation , particularl y 
describing the pl aces t o be searched and the 
per sons or property to be s eized." 
In State~- Gleason 32K. 245 (1884), the Court 
held that a comp l aint filed i n the district court 
charging a defnedant with a misdemeano r and verified 
on nothing but hear say and b elief, is not sufficent 
to authorize t he issuance of a warr ant for t he arr est 
of the party therein charged, when no previous pr re-
liminary examination, hav e been ha d. "Oath or 
.Affirmation" as called f or in the Bill of Rights mus t 
be positive with a sound bas e. 
In Sta t e ~· Bl ackman 32K. 615 (1884) , t he Court 
held that where a defendant in a prosecut ion, without 
objection, pleads to the merits of an a ct ion and goes 
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to trial, he waives all irregularities in t he veri-
fication of the inf ormation, and cannot afterward be 
h-eard to quest ion the regularity or validity of any 
proceeding in the case , if he urges no other ob jection 
to~ the proceeding than that such verification is in-
sufficient. Here a verification f or arr est on the 
mer e belief of the county attorney was insufficient, 
but t he defendant submitted to such faulty arrest and 
could not now challenge it. 
In State.!• Broo ks 33K. 708 (1885), the Court 
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held that where an information for arrest and prose-
cution i s sworn to posit i vel y by same pers on, it is not 
necessary for the county attorney to also verify the in-
formation by his own oath . 
In In re Kellam 55K. 700 (1895), the Court held 
as unconstitutional a statute conferri ng au thority upon 
the police officers of a city to make arrests for mis-
demeanors without warrant upon "reasonable suspcbcion" . 
If a warrant for arrest cannot be issued based on hear-
say (State v. Gleason, 32K. 245), certainly an arrest 
based on mere suspicion would not hold. 
In In~ Davis 68K.7 91 (1904), the Court he ld that 
section 15 of the Bill of Rights was not violated in 
compelling a banker to reveal a depositor's account. 
To obtain information from a witness of t he amount 
and- location of another's money or property cannot 
come within the constit tutional inhibition aga i nst 
unreasonable searches and seizures as no property is 
herein seized. 
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In State~· King 71K. 287 (1905 ), the Court held 
t hat where a compih.aint is properly filed and verified, 
a "John Doe" warrant may issue. To make it necessary 
to na111e criminals would give them a wide chance to go 
free. In this case where the :per son ma.king the veri-
fication could n&u e only t ,o of f our criminals, he 
neverthel ess, had f our definite persons in mind. 
In re Patterson 94K. 439 ( 1 91 5 ), Patterson was 
paroled by the district court and l ater his parole vms 
revoked and he was s ent back to prison . Patterson 
charged that there was not prioper informat ion to verify 
his violation of parole since there was no person to 
swear or affirm such. The Court held that failure of 
the convict to observe conditions of his parole i s not 
a new offense and that revocation of' parole and return 
of the convict to prison is not an added punishment, 
but r ather a disciplinary regul ation of :prison manage-
ment in carrying out the s entence already i mposed. The 
district court as parole court can set its ov.m- conditions 
of parole. 
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In State.!• Smithmeyer llOK. 172 (1921), the 
Court held that a prosecuting attorney through subpoena 
tecum ( thou shalt bring with thee) may compel the 
production of certain papers and records, but he cannot 
t ake the custody of those papers from the person pro-
ducing t hem. The attorney is not authorized to retain 
possession of documents after the examination of the 
witness has been completed. Securing do cuments duces 
tecu..m is not search and seizure. 
In State .Y.• Railwav Co. 115K. 3 (1924) , the Court 
held that the inspection of books, accounts, etc. of a 
railway company by the Public Utilities Commis sion does 
not violate the Bill of Rights. To hold that the state 
cannot inspect and examine the books , a ccounts , and 
records of domestic corpor ations, would be to say that 
the state which creates corporations has not the reserved 
power to control them. 
Section 16. of the Bill of Right s : 
"No person shall be i mprisoned f or debt, 
except in cases of fraud." 
In~~ Ebenhac k 17K. 618 (1877), the Court held 
that the legislature has power to provide t hat, when upon 
the trial of a misdemeanor the j ury shall find t he defen-
dant not guilty, and shall also find that the prosecution 
was instituted from malice or wi t hout probable ca.use, the 
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justice may adjudge the costs against the prose-
cuting witness, and, if he fail to pay or give security 
for their payment, may commit him to. the county jail 
until they are paid. Such imprisonment i s not in 
conflict with section 16 of the Bill of Rights. These 
costs are cast upon the a ccuser as a penalty, and they 
do not constitute strictly and simpl y a debt, in the 
technical sense of the word, any more than the fine im-
posed upon a. party convicted of assault and battery, is 
a debt. 
In Tennent, Wal ker and QQ_. y. Weymouth ( 25K. 21 
1881), the Court held that proof of fraud must be clearl y 
shown to sust ain i mprisonment for debt. In this case it 
was stated t hat the defendants h d made deeds of their 
farms to their wives but it was not shown that the wives 
were not bona fide creditors, or that there was any rea l 
fraud in the a.ct. Fraud was presumed but not actually 
proved. In order to justify the issue of an order of 
arrest, facts proving , and not merely f acts consistent 
with fraud should be stated in the affidavit. 
In Hauss~- Kohler 25K. 640 (1881), the Court held 
that the creditor in char ging fr aud is expected to make 
out a plain case and state definite ground for his action. 
Where an affidavit does not state any one of the grounds 
required by the statute under which the charge is being 
brought, all proceedings afterward had under it, or 
by virtue thereof, are void. 
I n In re Wheeler 34K. 96 (1885 ), the Court held -- ' 
?l 
t hat provisions of section 16 of the Bill of Rights 
applies only to liabilities arising upon contract. A 
father may be i mprisoned for failure to pay a j udgment 
rendered i n bastardy for the support of an illegitimate 
child since such judgment is not a debt v, ithin t he 
meaning of the Bill of Rights. 
In 1.!! Boyd 34K. 5?0 (1886), the Court held that 
i mpriso11 ..i11ent for failure to p y costs of t ri al is not 
i mprison.11ent f or debt. Judgment for costs is not a part 
of the punishrlent, and even where a pri s oner has been 
pardoned by the Governor he i s no releas ed f r om his 
liability to pay the co sts , or to be i mpri s oned in case 
they ar e not paid . The rights of the court officials 
to compensation for condutting trial are vested rights 
which cannot be disturbed or lessened by any par don from 
the governor. 
In In re Dassler 35K. 678 (1886), the Court rest ated 
that provisions of section 16 of the Bill of Rights apply 
only to liabilities arising upon contract , and that im-
prisonment for failure to p ay road tax does not violate 
the section. 
In State~· Weiss 84K. 165 (1911), t he Court held 
that section 16 of the Bill of Ri ghts permits the 
legislature to i mprison for fraudulent debt but does 
not compel the legis l ature to i mprison in such cases . 
Imprisonment i n cases of f ra.ua. i s opt i onal, but there 
can be no impri s on~1ent f or debt other than fraudulent . 
In Burnett~- Trirnmell 103K. 130 (1918 ), the 
"Bulk Salesn l asw was questioned. This l aw provided 
that s ale of goods shall be void as agians t the credi-
tors of the seller unless ~he purchaser receives from 
the sellei~ a lis t of names and addresses of the 
creditors and the purchaser at leas t seven days before 
t aking possession or paying t herefor notify every cre-
ditor whose name is listed • .Any s eller knowingly 
omitting the name of any creditor is subject to fine 
and imprisomnent. The Court he l d that ther e was no 
violation of the Bill of Ri ghts s ince i mprisonment as 
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provided in the statute was not f or failure to pay 
debts , but for failure to do the thing expressly enjoin-
ed by the statute in ref erence to preparing a l ist of 
creditors. Such regul ation was valid us e of the police 
power. 
In Board of Education~- Scoville 13K. l? (18?4), 
the Court held that a garnishee . ay not be indef inttely 
i mprisoned for fai lure to pay a debt t o a judgment-debtor. 
If such were the case, the garnishee could be imprisoned 
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forever, since there is no provision for hi s dischar ge 
before he pays the debt. The Court could give a def inite 
i mprisonment term as a punishment for cont empt. 
Section 17. of the Bill of Rights: 
"No distinction shall ever be ma.de between 
citizens of the stat e of Kans·as and citizens of 
other states an d t errit ories of t he United States 
with r ef erence tq the purcha se, enjoyment or des-
cent of property . Th e rights of aliens i n 
ref erence to t he purchas e , enjoyment of descent 
of property runy be regulated by l aw." 
(Thi s s ection was submitted to and adopted 
by t he people at t h e election of 1888 . The 
origina l section 17 read, "No di s tinct i on shall 
ever be made between citi zens and ali ens i n re-
ference to the purchase, enj oyment of des cent of 
property".) 
In Manley!• Mayer 68K. 377(1904 ), t h e Court held 
as constitutional a s t a tut e pr oviding f or enforcement 
of the contract obligat ion of a non- r esident by at t a ch-
ment and sale of his Kens as r~al e s tate in an act i on 
brought against t he non-res ident executor. The con-
tention that it was an unlawful di s crimi nation t o allow 
an attacrun.ent to issue aga inst a non- r es i dent and not 
against a r esident executor was met by t he f act that 
the proceeding was a mere device for obtaining juris-
diction of the property for the purpose of appl ying it 
to t he payment of debts, there being no other way by 
which personal jurisdiction of the non-resident could 
be obt a i ned s ince the court can not compel out-of - st at e 
residents to appear. 
74 
In Sparks I~ Bodensi ck 72K. 7 (1905), the plain-
tiff s ought to ·withhold t itle to one-hel f of an est ate 
from alien descendants on the ground t hat tl.t the time 
of the l andholder's death (1873} t he rule of t he common 
law, that a.liens cannot inhertt real estate, was in 
force in Kan sas. The Court held that the original sec-
tion 17 of the Bill of Ri ghts was such as to cause 
statutes determining the course of desc ent of property 
to apply equally t o a.liens and citizens. · 
In State I· Ellis 72K. 287 (1905) , the Court held 
that the common l aw did not apply and that resident 
cit izen h al f - s isters of the resident cit izen who died 
in estate, leaving neither widow nor children , and whose 
parents both had died bef ore h i m t'vhile non . r es ident aliens, 
can inherit i mmedi ately and directly the l ands of the 
deceased and such l ands shall not es cheat t o the stc1te . 
Under the common l aw hal f bloods could not inher it. 
In Cramer -:z.... Mccann 83K. 719 (1911), t he Court held 
that under the amended s ec t ion 17 of the Bill of Ri ghts, 
the legislature has full power t o enact laws regul atin g 
the r i ght of aliens to ho l d r eal estate. An act, pro-
viding that resident citizens of t he United St ates can 
not inherit lands in this stat e t hroug the operat ion of 
the statute of descent s and distributions when t hey must 
trace their desc ent through a cousin of the parent, who 
was an alien at the time of his death, is constitu-
tional. 
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In Johnson y. Olson 92K. 819 (1914), the Court 
held that in the absence of a governing treaty, and un-
der section 17 of the Bill of Rights as adopted in 
1888, where there is not statute regulating the inheri -
tance of property by aliens , the common law rule 
that an alien cannot inherit from a deceased citizen 
prevails. 
In Botello y. Tharp 121K. 229 (1926), the Court 
restated the rule that in the absence of a federal 
treaty or a nontrolling statute, an alien can neither 
tak e land by des cent nor transmit it to another, Un-
der common l aw citizen childre n can not i nherit from 
an alien father. 
In .Rieman y. Rieman 123K. 718 (1927), the appel-
lant was adopted by a brother of the deceased intestate 
pursuant to an Illinois statute which declar ed that 11 to 
all other persons (than the adoptive parents) the ad-
opted child shall stand related as if no such act of 
adoption had been taken11 • The Court held that such 
limited status of adoption bars her rights to s hare in 
t he estate of the brother of he r adoptive father, and 
that such ruling does not violate the constitution. 
'l'he appellant was not denied the right of inheri ta nee 
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because she was a citizen of Illinois, but because of 
the limited s tatus of adoption conferred upon her. 
In Riemann y . Ri~ 124K . 539 (1927), t he Court 
reversed its form e r ruling and held that the devolution 
of intestate personal property is governed by t he law 
of the domicile of the descendant, and the devolution 
of intestate real property is governed by the law of 
the state where it is situated. A child adopted in a 
foreign state has inheritable capacity to lands si tua-
ted in t his state in confo rmit y wit h our l aws govern-
ing t he distri bu tion of intestate estat es, notwithstand-
ing the laws of t :ie foreign state where t he adoption 
proceedings were effected imposed upon the child a 
disqualificatio n to i nherit from t he col lateral kin-
dred of her adoptive pa.rent. 
In Fergus Y· Tomlinson 126K. 427 (1928), the Court 
held that the common l aw i s in f o r ce in this state un-
less abrogated by statute. Under t he common l aw ali-
enage is not an obstacle to t he acquisition of title 
to personal property by one next of kin. The hus band , 
in this case a British subject, may i nherit his wife's 
personal property. 
In summary of the foregoing cases it may b e stated 
that the Supreme Court of the State of Kam as has held 
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its citizens to the following principles: 
1. Property used as selling place for liquor is 
lien for fine and costs reg ardless of ownership. 
( 34K. 425) 
2. The legislatur e has entire control of the devolu-
tion of prope r ty on death of the owner. (103K. 508) 
3 . A warrant for arrest cannot be issued only on 
heaBs ay an d belief . ( 32K. 245) 
4 . If an objection to faulty arrest is to stand, 
it must be made before the defendant goes to 
trial. ( 32K. 615) 
5 . Oath of county atto rn ey i s not essential to veri-
fy an information f or arrest. (33K. 708) 
6 . Arrests cannot be made upon suspicion alone. 
( 55K. 700) 
7. Search and seizure is not violated in compelling 
a banker to reveal a depositor ' s account. (68K. 791). 
8 . It is not necessary to name the criminals i n 
issuing warrant for t heir arrest. ( 71K. 287) 
9. Ap prisoner may be seized for violation of 
parole at the discretion of the parole court. 
( 94K. 439) 
10. Prosecuting attorney can 1 t retain possession 
of documents which he has forced into court t hrough 
duces tecum. (llK. 172) 
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11. A railroad company's records may be examined 
by the state. (115K. 3 ) 
12. An accusor wh o brings prosecut ion from malice 
and without probable cause may be i mprisoned for 
failure to pay costs i n t he case which he has in-
stigated. (17K. 618 ) 
13. Proof of fraud mus t be cl early shown to sus -
tain imprisonm ent for debt. ( 25K. 21) 
14. A creditor charging fraud must make out a 
plain case and state definite grounds f o r h is ac-
tion ( 25K- 640) 
15. 11 Debtu as used in section 1 6 of the Bill of 
Ri ghts applies only to liabiliti es arising upon 
con tract. (34K. 96) 
16. Imprisonment for f ailure to pay costs of trial 
is not imprisonment for II debt11 • ( 34K. 570) 
17. I mprisonme nt f or f ailure to pay road tax is 
not i mprisonmen t for "debt". (35K. 678) 
18. Imprisonment f or fraudulent debt is optional 
and not co mpulsory. (84K. 165 ) 
19. 'ritle to property may be voided if condi-
tions of transfer are not met. (103K. 130) 
20. A garnishee may not b e indefinitely imprlilsoned 
until he s hall pay a de )t to a judgment-debtor. 
( 13K. 17) 
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21. Discrimination is legal which permits a tt a c llment 
to issue agai ns t a non-resident and not a gainst a 
resi d ent executor. ( 68K. 377) 
22. Under t h e o r i ginal section 17 of the Bil l of 
Rights, statutes ap plied equally to aliens and cit-
i z ens • ( 7 2K • 7 ) 
23. Common law rule t hat half-bloods cannot i nherit 
does no t apply in Kans as. (72K. 287) 
24 . The leg i s lature has full pow er to enact laws 
regulating the right of al iens to hold real es-
tate. (8 3K . 719) 
25. In absence of s Latutory regul ation , t he common -
law rule t hat an all en cannot inherit from a de-
ceas ed citizen p revails. ( 92K. 819) 
26. Devolution of intestate real prop er ty is g ov-
erned by t h e law of t he state where it is situated. 
( 124K. 539) This reversed ( 123K. 712) 
27. Common law is in force i n this state unless 
abrogated by Statute. (12 6K . 427) 
CHAPTER VII 
SLAVERY; BAIL; J"USTICE WITHOUT DELAY 
This chapter includes sections 6, 9, and 18 of 
the Bill of Rights. ~ection 6, prohibiting slavery 
or involuntary servitude except for punishment of· 
cri me, has been before the oupreme Court in only 
four cl_ear-cu t cases, none of wh ich have been in re-
cent years . Section 9, concerning bail and punish-
ments, has been nj_ne times directly involved in ;;jupreme 
Court cases. Section 18, guaranteeing remedy by due 
course of law , has furnished grounds for much liti-
gation . '1'he increasing i mporta nc e of t h i s section is 
evidenced by the fact that ne arly half the cases have 




Section 6 of the Bill of Rights: 
There shall be no slavery in this state; 
and no involuntary servitude, except fo r the 
punishment of cri me, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted. 
In re Dassler 35K. 678 ( 1886) , the uourt held 
act requiring work on the roads to pay poll 
valid. Perf orlW.nce of work up on an assessment 
or levy payable in labor for the repair of roa ds or 
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streets, is not that kind of involuntary servitude 
intended to be embraced within section 6 of the bill 
of J:{ight s. Mi lita r y service is also compulsory, but 
it is not held in conflict with t he Bill of Rights. 
There are certain services which may be co mnanded fo r 
t h e good of s ociety through the police p ower . 
In City of' To:peka v. Boutwell ·. 53K . 20 ( 1894) , 
an ordinan ce permitt i ng emp loyment of city prisoners 
on the stre ets was held valid. The defendants were 
jailed for failure to pay their fi nes and we re put to 
work a t $1 per day credit on their fines . The Cou rt 
argued that the labor was not menti oned in the sentence 
a nd could har dly be considered as a valid part of t h e 
pun i shment . :::;treet labor was held as a proper means 
of col lecting the fine s and as discipline for the 
p risoners . 
In In re Wheeler _34K . 96 (1885), previously 
cited, the Court held that i mprisonment for failu re 
to pay a j udgment under the bastardy act for the nB.in-
ten ance and educa t ion of an illegitimate child was 
proper and constitutional. 
In I n re Boyd 34K. 570 (188 6), p reviousl y cited , 
the Court held tha t i mprisonment for non- pa yment of 
the costs is no pa rt of t he punishment and is a proper 
means of enforcing payment. 
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Section 9 of the Bill of Rights: 
All persons shall be bailable by suf'f'icient 
sureties excep t for capital offense s , where 
p roof is evident or the p resump tion great . 
Exces s i ve bai 1 shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines i mposed, n o r cruel or unusual 
punis hment inflicted . 
In State v . White 4 4K . 514 (1890), a nineteen 
yea.r old boy was c onvicted for rape of a sixteen yea r 
old girl of questionable cha r a cter and was sentenced 
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5 to 21 years at hard l~bor. In revievving the sentence, 
the Court held that a lthough the punishment may be 
considered severe , yet it is not unconstitutional. 
Impris onment at h ard labor is not of itself a cruel 
or unusual punishment within the mean ing of the Bill of 
Rights . 
I n In re Ellis 76K. 368 ( 1907), the c ourt h eld 
that the r efu sal of the county co mmissioners to dis- . 
cha r g e a convicted p erson who has been found to b e un-
able to pay the fine or costs wil l not make his i m-
prisonment cruel or unusual . 
-In In re Schneck 78K. 20? (1908), the Uourt h eld 
that p enalty is incurred when the a ct of cri me is 
co mmi tt..ed. A p erson charged with the crime o:t' murder 
in the first degree, at a tirm when the statute pre-
scribed the penalty of death for the of fense, is not, 
whe re the proof is evident or the presumption g reat, 
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entitled to bail, a lthough the prosecution for the 
offense may have been co mraenced after the rep eal of 
that penalty and the enactment of an amendment im-
p osing the penalty of imprisonment for life. Murder 
in the first degree was a capital of fense at the time 
it was here co mrn.i tted , and therefore t he def'endant 
was not entitled t o bail. 
In State v . Gillmore 88K.: 8 36 l}913), the (;ourt 
held tha t nard labor in the penitentiary not exceeding 
two years was not unusual or cruel punishment for 
failure to o bey orders of' support in a · c a se of de-
serti on and non-sup port of wi:f e or family . 
In Tatlow v. Hacon 101K. 27 (1 917) , the Gourt 
held tha t statutory prov i s ion that· n execution msLy 
issue .aga inst the person of a debtor for c ert ain fraud -
ulent a cts i s not violative of l imitati on against 
cru el and u nusual punishments. ·A prison sentence is 
proper for fraud in inducing the plaintiff to ex -
ch ange land for a worthl ess dee d. 
In State v. c;oletti 102K. ·523 ( 1918), the Court 
held a s not violative of '' e x cessive bail" a statute 
providing that in appeals from convictions in mis-
demeanors, the defendant is to give a bond conditioned 
upon the payment of the fine and costs within thirty 
days after affirn:ation of the judgment by the appellate 
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court, and also to give a bond co n di tioned that he 
will not violate, p ending t h e appeal, the law under 
which the conviction was ob tained. 
I n In re B~ll 106K . 536 { 1920), the Court held 
that a statute of 1911, providing n o b a il for persons 
cha r g ed with murder i n the first degree where proof- i s 
evident or presu:m_pti on gr eat, viola tes t h e bill of 
Rights. Tufurder in the f irst degree was not in 1920 
pun i shable capi t ~lly, and p ersons charged with that 
offense co uld not be denied bail . 
In Dav i son v. Davison 1 25K . 80 7 .(1928 ), the Court 
held tha t j a iling a partn e r in a divorce suit for co n-
temp t of court b ecaus e she cannot deliver to the hus-
band an automobile, which has fallen · nto t he hands 
of the sheriff, or money which nas _a lre a dy b een spent, 
amounts to li f e imprisonment a nd is voide d by sectj_on 9 
of t h e 13i 11 of Rights as '·' cruel a nd unusual u . It is 
proper for the court to jail for c ontempt where it is 
implied tha t the court' s or ders ca n be ob eyed , b ut 
here it was i n~ossi b l e to obey the m. 
In In re Ma cLean 147K. 146 ( 1938 ), the <:.fourt 
held that judgment i mp osing consecutive pe riod s of 
penal servitude in accordance wi t h the verdict of 
guilty on specific counts charged in _ the info r mation 
did not violate section 9 of the Bill of Righ ts f or-
bidding cruel and unusual p unishments. 
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oection 18 of the Bill of rtight s: 
All persons, for injuries suf f ered in 
person, reput a tion or property, shall nave 
remedy by due course of law , and justice 
administrated withou t delay. 
In K. P. Railway Co . v . Yan z 16K. 5'73 (18 76 ) , 
the Court held that section 18 of the Bill of' Rights 
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is not violated by a st a tute giving t h e owner of 
live s tock the ri ght to recov er attorney-fees and denying 
that ri ght to the railway c ompa.ny, where the railway 
company has kil led livestock f or t h e p l aintiff . ~h is 
is c onsid ered p ro p er use of p olice pow e r to pro tect 
the genera l we ll-being. Attorney's fees in these cases 
might b e mo r e t han t h e p rice of the lost livestock . 
In In re Davis 58K . 368 ( 1897) , a legislative 
co I11J11ittee sitting after t he l egis l a ture had adjourned 
sine die sou ght to hold .Davis for comtempt on h is 
refusal to produce c ertain recor ds . 'l' h e Court held 
that t h e co mmittee had no power to imprison the wit-
ness. The House i t self could have i mprisoned f or con-
tempt, but such p ower coul d not be perpetuated in a 
co mmittee. 
In Atchison, 'l'opeka and Santa F e R~ R. v. 
Matthews 58K. 447 (1897), previously cited, the Court 
held tha t collection of attorney's fees from a railroad 
along with damages for fire caused by a loco motive was 
in the nature of a police regulation, designed to 
enforce care on the part of the railway company and 
was not intended to place a burden on such companies 
that private persons are not required to bear. 
In Buckwalter v. ochool District 65K. 603 (1902), 
the plaintiff cha rged that she should have been no-
tified, before hand tha t she was in t h e proces s of ob-
taining fro m the state could be taken for a school 
house site. The Court h eld that under eminent domain 
the plaintiff has a right to his day in cou rt on the 
question of comp ensation, but he has no righ t to a 
day in court on the question of a pprop ri a tion by the 
state unless some statute r e quires it. The state s 
right to t a Ke land exists independen ly of notice. 
In Hanson v. Krehbiel 68K. 670 (1904), the Court 
ruled that a statute, providing that in cases of libel 
where the writer public1y retra cts his statements, t he 
injured is entitled only to what actual financial loss 
he can show resulted, is void as not allowing due 
course of law to show injury through disgrace, rid-
icule, and humiliation, which could only be determined 
by a trial considering the circumstances. Remedy by 
due course of 1aw as used in the Bill of Rights, means 
the reparation for injury, ordered by a tribunal hav-
ing jurisdiction, in due course of' procedure and after 
a fair hearing. 
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In Cooper v. oearverns 81K. 267 (1909), pre-
viously cited, the Court he ld that the common law 
rule, that spoken words imputing unchastity to a 
female are not actionable without allegation and proof 
of special damages, deprives women of due process as 
her reput ation is one of her most v aluable assets. 
In Shade v. Cement Co. 93K. 257 (1914), the Court 
held tha t an employee has no co nsti tuti onal grounds 
to object to provisions of the workmen 1 s comp ensation 
1aw since its operation r e sts up on the free consent 
of employer and emp loyee. Without consent to come 
under the co mpensation law, the employee may retain 
his remedies under common and statutory law. 
In Oil and Gas Co. v. ~trauss llOK. 611 (1923), 
the defendant argued that the district court was pre-
judiced against the .defendant 1 s case and re ached a 
conclusion without due process. It was pointed out 
that after motion for a new trial and the motion f or 
additional findings of fact were filed, b ut before 
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they were heard, the judge took co p ies of the motions, 
c onsider ed them together with the pleadings and evidence, 
and wrote down a conclus ion concerning what should. be 
done on the motions. Afterward the motions were heard 
and the court rendered judgment in accordance with 
the previous written conclusion. 'l'he Court held that 
here was no violation of due process, tha t both parties 
were heard, and that the judge could have changed his 
farmer con cl us ion if the or a l arguments warranted such 
change. 
In Railroad and Light Co. v . Court of Industrial 
Rel at ions 113K. 217 ( 1923), previously cited, the 
Court held that there was no violation of due process 
and that the police power was properly used where the 
Public Utilities Commission nullified contracts con-
cerning rates for electricity to be supplied by an 
electric power company to a street railway, when per-
formance of those contracts at the agreed schedules 
of rates so materially diminished the revenues of 
the power company as to cause other customers of the 
p ower company to have to bear a p ortion of the burden 
resulting from such contracts. 
In Glenn v. Gallahan 125.K. 44 ( 1928), the <.;ourt 
held as not violative of section 18 of the .bill of 
Rights, a statute de claring that all transfers of 
p roi)erty by a stockholder, after the closing of a 
bank and before the payment of the double liability, 
as provided in the statute, shall be void as against 
said double liability. ·the Court argue d that banking 
was a ·business in which th e public has a vital interest 
and for that reason it is subject to control by the 
state under its police power. 
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In Wichit a Council v. Security ~enefit Ass•n 
138K. 841 (1934), the uourt held that a benef it 
society orga nized and operating under the laws of 
this state is not authorized to enact a by-law giving 
it s national executive committee authority to suspend 
a subordinate coun cil and dissolve its charter without 
charges having been filed, notice given thereon, and 
a hearing t hereof . It was argued that such proceeding 
was a t aking away of property rights even though pro-
vision had been made for transfer of the members to 
other councils and insurance was kept intact . Such 
transfer meant exp ense for the members. 
ln Trimble v. U ity of' Topeka 14 7K. 111 ( 1938) , 
the plaintiff cha llenged a city ordi nance regulating 
barbering where such ordinance denied rughts granted 
by t he state and granted rights denied by the st a te . 
The Court held tha t the city ordinance was void, and 
that if' a barber met the state regulations it was 
eno ugh . Buch a n ordinance would properly come under 
the police power, but _in this case it added nothing 
to the general welfare· not already provided for by 
statute. 
In Kansas City Life Insur~nce · co. v. Anthony 
142K. 671 (1935), the Court held that where a judg-
ment bas been rendered by a co mp etent court against 
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the defendant, ordering a sheriffts sale of real 
property encumbered by mortgage and fixing the proper 
· period of redemption under the law then existing, such 
judgment is~ adjudicata when no ap peal is taken 
therefrom, and cannot be annulled or set a side by 
subsequent act of the legislature. In this ca se the 
petition in foreclosure was filed in 1932 before the 
mortgage mora torium laws were passed, and the defenda nt 
was not denied due process by being refuse.d the b enefit 
of such 1aws. 
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In Schuler v. Rehberg 145K. 174 (1937), a dis-
trict court, against. the wishes of the judgment c r editor, 
refuised to confirm a sale in forec l osur e where the sale 
would pay only a part of the debt. he Court h e l d 
that where there is no i r regularity in the p roceecting s, 
and no substanti a l dis.parity between t h e actua l value 
of the property and the selling price at the sale in 
foreclosure, the judgment creditor has an absolute 
right to have the sale confirmed, and to deny such 
right violates even handed justice t .o all li t i gants. 
In Leigh v. City of Wichita 148K. 614 (1938), 
. the uourt held that city zoning ordinances come under 
. -
the police p ower and do not violate the Hill of nights 
by taking property without due process of law. 
In Loomis v. City of Augusta 151K. 343 (1940), 
the plaintiff contended that construction of a dike 
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along the river would so change the flow of flood 
waters as to inundate his land where before it wa s 
safe from flood. He sought com.p en sation for loss in 
value of his land since he could not now sell it for 
residential plots. fhe Court held tha t since there 
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was no actual appropriation of any property the owner 
was not entitled to claim damages for merely incidenta.l, 
indirect and consequential injuries which his property 
might sustain by reason of a public work or construction. 
However, such a decision will not stop t he plaintiff 
from bringing a subsequent action if actual damage 
does occur. 
In Callen v. Junction City 43K. 627 (1890), t he 
plaintiff' charged that i n corporation of his property 
into t h e city was a violation of the .Bill of rtights 
in t hat it took pr ivate property for p ublic use with -
out just compensation. Th e Court held that the me re 
change of the use of land from agricultural to city 
purposes is not taking of private property f or public 
use. 
In State v. McM3.nus 65K. 720 (1902), the state 
condemned and publicly destroyed liquor, containers, 
and bar. The defendant charged discrimination against 
them and their property and that property could not 
be thus destroyed. The Court held that the defendant 
had been ven notice and opportunity to def end his 
property and that as public nuisance the property 
could legally be destroyed. Property so kept and used 
is tried i~ ~' regardless of "whether there has been 
an arrest or conviction of the person charged with main-
taining the place. 
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In Chamberlain v. Mo. Pac. H.R. Co. 107K. 341 
(1920), previously cited, the uourt held that co mpul-
sion of a railroad company to arn st ruct a private crossing 
on land through· which they had obta ined a right-ot·-way, 
deprived the r a ilroad of prop erty without just comp en-
sation and violated the ~ill of Hights. 
In Edmonds v. ~ ederal ~ecuritie s uo. 131K. 11 
{1930), the defendant charged that a statute author-
izing the trial court to render judgment against a 
litigant who refuses to answer questions or to produce 
books, pap ers and documents pe rtinent to the issues 
of fact, is viola tive of the Bill of Hi ght s in tha t i t 
deprives the defendant of property without due process. 
The Court held that it· is proper for the legislature 
to facilit a te litigation, and tha t in this case the 
defendant is not deprived of property without due process. 
He is· entitled to his day in court if he wi 11 abide 
by the code of procedure which the l e gislature nas 
adopted for the guidance of the courts. 
In Hushaw v. Kansas .!farmers union .Royality~. 
149K. 64 (1939), previously cited, the Court held 
that a statute providing that instruments conveying 
mineral ri ghts are v oid unless recorded within 90 
days a fter execution and if not l isted for t axation, 
was not void a s cal ling for f orf ei tur e of property 
with out due process . Requirements set down in the 
statute are to b e considered a c~ndition precedent to 
the vesting of title in the transf eree and not a 1·or-
feit ur e of a vested title. 
SUMMA.RY 
In summary of the cases in this chap ter it may 
be stated that the Supreme uourt of - the state of 
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Kansas has held its citizens to the following p rinc iples: 
l. Work on the roads to pay poll tax is not in-
voluntary servitude. (35K. 678) 
2. Fri s one rs in the city jai 1 may be required 
to wo rk on the streets. ( 53K. 20) 
3. Imprisonment is legal for f ailure to support 
an illegitinate child. ( 34K. 96) 
5. Sentence of 5 to 21 years at hard labor for 
comnutting rape is not cruel or unusual punish-
ment. {44K. 51~) 
6. Penalty is incurred when the act of crime 
is co mm.itted and comes un de r sta t ute s t h en in 
force. ( '78K. 20 7 ) 
7. Two years at hard labor is not a cruel or 
unusual punishment for non-support of wife. 
( 88K. 836) 
8. Prison sentence for a debtor convicted of 
fraudulent acts is not cruel a nd unusual pun-
i sh men t . ( 10 lK. 2 7 ) 
9. .Hequirement of a double b ond, one for fine 
and costs, and one for l awful behavior does not 
violate "excessive ba il". (102K. 523) 
10. Bail c an be r e fused only in capit a l of fense. 
(106.K. 536) 
11. Person may not be i mprisoned for contempt 
where it is impossible to obey the court 1 s 
orders. ( 125K. 807) 
12. there is no limit to the length of a total 
sentence which may be imposed by consecut ive 
sentences on specific counts. (147:K. 146) 
13. In certain suits for damages, railroads 
rray be held to pay attorney's fees for the 
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plaintiff. { 16K. 573) 
14. A legislative committee sitting after the 
legislature has adjourned ~ine _3ie can 1 t hold 
a witness for contempt. ( 58K. 368 ) 
15. under eminent domain, the state may approp -
riate one's land without even giving notice of 
such intentions. (65K. 603) 
16. lvlere payment of wh a t actual f inanci al loss 
ca n be shown does not cancel a lib el ch arge. 
( 68K. 670) 
17. Anything that detra cts from a wonan's 
character is actiona·ble in cou rt. ( 81K . 267 ) 
18. An emp loyee has no grounds to ob ject to 
conditions which h e volunta rily l ect s for .him-
self. ( 93K . 257) 
19. A judge may write down a dec i sion against 
a litigant before hearing his comp leted case. 
t 110K. 611) 
20. Through th~ state, contracts between 
utility companies may be ob ligated. ( 113.K . 217) 
21. .1:'rop erty o"bta ined from a stockh older of a 
closed bank is subject to liabilities of the 
former owner. (125K. 44) 
22,. .National officials of an organi za ti on can-
not dissolve a local branch without notice a nd 
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hearing. (138K. 841) 
23. A barber need not meet city r egulation~ 
where they .conflict with state regulations. 
( 148K. 111) 
24. ::i.tat e moratorium laws do not apply to ca ses 
where proceeding s were b egun before 1933. 
l 142K. 671) 
.\ 
2 5. 'lhe court may not refuse to co nfirm a. 
fore clo sure sale where there are no i'regula rities 
and the price is reasonable. (14 5K. 174) 
26. One has no remedy against a city that suo-
tract s fro m the v alue of onets property by zoning 
ordinances. ( 148K. 614) 
27. A public construction may indir ectly re -
duce the value of one's prop erty and t here is 
no i m..me diate remedy. (151:K. . 343) 
28. une's property may be incorpora ted into a 
city and brought under its jurisdiction and one 
is entitled to no compensation. ( 43K. 627 ) 
29. ~iquor p r operty may be destroyed whether 
or not there has been any arrest of the proprietor. 
( 65K. 72 0 ) 
30. A railroad co mpany may not be comp elled to 
construct a private crossing at its own -expense. 
(107K. 3~1) 
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31. 'l'he court may render judg ment a gainst a 
liti,g ant wh o refuses to p roduce pa p ers and 
documents. (131K. 11 ) 
32. 'rhe le gisl a t ure may set u p conditions of' 
transfer of p rop erty wh ich must be me t o r the 
p ro perty must later be f orfeited. (149K. 64 ) 
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CHAPTER VIII 
'l' RL L BY JURY; :HABEAS CORPUS; ·1·RIAL PROCEDURE 
'l;his. chapter includes sections 5, 8 , and 10 of 
the Bill of Rights .• ~ection 8, gua r anteeing the right 
to the writ of habea s corpus, has been i ndirectly in-
volved in many c as es, but on no occasion has direct 
viola tion of this section be en charged . Sect ions 5 
and 10, dealing w ith trial by jury .and tria l pr oce dure, 
have been involved in cases ·befo re t h e t>upreme Court 
more often t han any other sections of t he Bill of 
Rights. In mor e than one hundred fifty cases has 
violation 6f one or oo~h of t h ese secti ons b een con-
tended. These cas e s are f'ai rly evenly distributed 
through the years, a nd in almost every term since its 
beginning , the stat e ::i.upreme Court bas been ca lled 
" 
upon to de termine the meaning of t h e se sections. 
Section 5 of the Bill of Bights f 
'I'he right of trial by jury shall be inviolat e. 
In Kimball v . Connor 3K .· 410 ( 1866) , the Court 
held tha t section 5 of the Bill of Rights does not 
requi re every trial to be by jury. Trial by jury is 
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guaranteed only in t h ose ca ses triable a t common law. 
In st a tutory and cha ncery p roceedings t h e legi s l a ture 
is co mpetent to di s p en se with t h e jury . An a c t ion to 
cont e s t a will i s a n e quitabl e p rocee di ng an d may be 
trie d without a jury . 
In St a te v . Allen 5K. 213 ( 1 8 69) , the Gour t h e l d 
t ha t in a ll origina l proceeding s , the o upreme Gourt 
h a s p ower t o send i ssu e s of fa ct to a j u r y f or tr i a l, 
wheth er, a s a matter of str i ct ri ght, eithe r party i s 
entitled to a jury tri a l or not . 
I n City of .l!.mpor ia v . Volmer 12K . 62 2 (1 8 74) , 
the Court h e ld that where a sta tute auth ori z e s a t ri a l 
before a mut,1ici pal court, wit h out a j ury, f' or a v j.-
olation of a city or dinance, a nd a t t he same time 
secures to the defend ant a n appe a l t h ere f ro m, clog ged 
by no u n rea so na ·ble r estric t ions, to an appella t e 
court in wh ich he has a right to a tri a l by a j ur y , 
su c h summa ry proc eeding is not i n co nf lict with t h e 
constitut ional provision that the 0 ri gh t of t r i a l by 
jury sha ll be inviola te" . 
I n Boa r d of Educ at ion v. ~covil l e 1 3K . l ? 
(18 74), the Uourt held tb..a t in proc e e ding s for the 
recovery of money a man ' s rights ~an b e determined 
a gainst h is w i 11 only oy a jury, a nd in s uch c a ses 
an order made by tbe court is not suf'ficient . 
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In Ross v. C9rmnissioners of Crawf ord Count;x; 
16K. 411 (1 8 76) , the p l a intiff sought a jury tria l 
in proceedings to co rr ect assessments . The Court 
held that one is entitled to a jury only in those 
cases and proceedings as prior to the constitution 
gave the ri ght to a j u r y . As to a ll other m.a.t ters 
wh ich p rio r t o t h e . constit u tion were disp o se d. of oy 
sumrra ry p roceedings , the legisla t ur e ma y ITB,ke similar 
pr ov is i on t o day • s t o pr oceedi ngs in assessnient , 
not enforcing in a ny way a penalty , either by f ine or 
by double or t r iple t ax, no ri ght to j u ry e x i sted 
prior to t he c onst it uti on . 
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I n Hi xon v. Ge orge 18K . 253 (18 77) ,. t h e Court 
h eld th a t the u esti on of 1:Yhether credit r s o:r t h e 
husba nd could look t o the f amily re s iden ce in the 
wife ' s name f or set tlement of t hetr clatms i s an 
a ction in t he natur e of a s u it in e qu ity, a nd th a t 
the court may i n it s di scret ion d.eci de the case o r 
s end a l l or any part of it t o a jury . l f the court 
s end s al 1 t h e i ssu e s to a jury , it may do so by a 
gene r al order, with out even mentioning any p articular 
i s we, and the jury may t h en f ind a g eneral v e~dict 
on all issues of both fact and law , unles s otherwise 
order by t h e court . 
I n ..Q~rpent.er v . ca rpenter 30K. 712 (1 883), 
the Court h eld t hat a tri ai court is not in error in 
re:ru sing to submit a divorc e case to a jury f or trial. 
Such cas~s a re p ro perly tried by the court, which 
may or may not or der ··any is sue or i s sue s in such ca se 
to be trie d by a jury. 
ln In re Rolfs 30K . 758 (188 3), the petit i oner 
was fined by a police judge for keeping a nu i sance 
a nd was refused an a pp ea l t o the distric t court. The 
Court held that in t h i s c ase sect ion 5 of th e .tsill 
of Rights w a. s violated. lf the prosecution invo lved 
nothing o f a criminal nature, as one charged with 
auctioneering with out a license, then t he con stitu-
tiona l gua r an te e mi ght not be applicabl e ; b ut w~ e re 
the cha r ge is cri mj_nal a t co rnmon l <;'l.W , crimi na 1 in its 
nature, tri al by jury must be pre ser v e d . 
I n In re Bu r r ON s 38K . 675 ( 188 8) , the Cour t h eld 
tha t a judgment de btor is not entitled to tria l by 
jury to determine whethe r he unjustly refuse s to appl y 
money in h is possessi on toward satis f a ct i on of the 
judgment u nde r which proceedings a re had . 
In State v . City of 'l' opeka 3 6K . 76 (1 886) , the 
Court h eld t hat p erso n s violating city ordi nances 
requiring work on t h e str e ets are not entitled to 
tria l by jury because such ri ght did not exist pri or 
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t o the adoption of the cons ti tuti on. The co nsh -
tution preserves the ri ght to tri al by jury only a s 
it e x i st ed in 1859 . 
In Callen v . J·unction City 43K. 627 (1890), 
previously cited, the Gourt h eld tha t extension of 
the limits of a city is a p urely le gisl ative p owe r 
and such a power i s not exercised by mean s of a · 
j ury trial. A l andowner has no ri ght to a jury trial 
t o determine whether .h is l a nd may b e incorpora, ted 
into a city adjoining. 
In In re Sobn 55K . 694 (1 895 ), the pet itioner 
was fined in police court for s elling liquor, and 
according to a statute of 1889 h e cou ld n ot ap p e a l to 
the district cou rt until h e o f fered sure ty both fo r 
his appearance a t the district court and for h is pay-
ment of the fine an d costs should the case go against 
hi m in the di strict court. '.i'he Cou rt h eld t hat the 
statute of 1889 was un constitutional as an unreason-
able restri ction on a p peal and jury trial. the char g e 
here was of' criminal nature and the defen dant wa:s 
entitled to a jur y tri a l which could be ob t a ined by 
an unrestricted appeal to the di strict court . 
I n State v . o i mins 61K . 752 ( 1900), the Gou r t 
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held tha t the assent of a defendant u p on trial on a 
charg e of felony to the discha r g e of one o:t' t h e jurors, 
· with an ag·r e ement to submit to a ver dict by the re-
maini ng n umb er, i s i neffe ct ual to b i nd h i m, a nd in 
such cas e, in t he ev en t of an a dv er se verdict, h e is 
enti t le d to a r e tri a l, not with st an ding h is agreement. 
Common l aw require s a jury of twelv e for tri ~l o f 
issue s of fa ct i n c ommo n law cases i n cou rt s of record . 
When s ecti on 5 of t h e .!:$ill o f" rti gh ts s ays ••i nviolat e " , 
it me ans as e s t ablish ed, and a t welve man jury was 
estab lished at the ti me of the ado ption of the co n sti-
tution . 'l'ri a l ·by j ury in felonies involving p ub lic 
welfare a re not pro perly waive d by the de f enda nt since 
it is to the interes t of the st a t e t o a c cor d a j u ry 
trial. 
In s war z v. Kamala 63K . 633 (1901 ) , the p l a in-
tiff' acquiesed in the loc ation of a bounda r y line, 
and then l a ter rep udi a ted such act ion a nd a s ked f or 
a jury trial to determine the boundary. i'he Court 
held that a dispute re g arding a bounda ry does not in 
a prop er sense involve tit le to real p ro p erty and is 
not in the class of controversies where a jury ca n be 
dema nded a s a ma tt er of ri ght. The est ablishment of 
boundary lines by a county surveyor is a st a tutory 
proceeding and was not triable by jury at common law • 
. E'urthermor e, if the defendant had any right to a jury 
trial, he waived it by his previous acquiescence . 
ln In re Effie Kinsel 64K. 1 ( 1902), in denying 
a jury to the p etitioner, who was convicted of violat-
ing a city ordj.nance by k eep ing a b awdy hou se, the 
Court h eld that prior to the ado pt ion of the consti-
tution juries were not allowed in local police courts 
in pro s ecutions for infra ct~on o f ordina nces and local 
regulations passed under police p·ower. 'l'he Court 
argued that the defendant had been given a rea sonable 
opportunity to appeal to the di strict court and a jury 
trial, and that the refusal of the police court to 
accept an appeal bond for ei bhty dollars signed only 
by th~ defend ant was not an unreasonable restraint to 
appeal. 
In Wheel er v. c;a1dwe.11 S8K. 776 ( 1904) , a dis-
pute over a n elect ion count caused the plaintif f to 
ask for a jury in -9.,~ warranto pro ceedings . 'l'he 
Court h eld that · a. jury trial is n ot demandable as a 
nat ter of right in a proceeding in .9-~ warranto . The 
first Kansas territorial legislature adopted corrnnon 
law of England and all statutes and acts of Parliament 
made prior to the fourth yea:r o:r .Tames .ll'irst whi ch 
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were of a gener al nature and . were not in conflict 
with the constitution of the ·united ::Hates or with t he 
provi si ens of the Jiansas-.N ebraska a ct. Thus the common 
law as it existed in England in 160'7 became the co mmon 
law of Kansas. oince it was not. until 1730 that by 
act of" Parl ia.ment a jury was awarded in .9,£.2, warrant o 
proceedings, such right is not preserved in the con-
stitution of Kansas. 
In State v. Wells 69K . 792 ( 1904), the iJourt 
held tha t in the prosecution of a misdemeanor the 
defendant, with consent of the prosecuting attorney 
and the court, may waive a trial by a ful 1 jury and 
consent to be tried by 11 men. At common law selling 
liquor was triable without a j ry and so the case 
might n ow be tried with less than the common law 
twel ve-m,cyn j ury . t)ince consequences of . conviction 
for misdemeanor are less serious than for felony, the 
a ction or duty of society to hold a jury trial may 
in this case be rel axed and the will of the individ.ual 
allowed. 
In Stahl v. 1.,ee '71K. 511 ( 1905), the Court held 
that property seized by the p olice under order of the 
police c ourt as used for liquor may be destroyed in 
police court without any trial by jury so long as 
the defendant has a right to appeal to the district 
court and a jury trial, even though such appeal must 
be .within 10 day s after the seizure. 
ln Mil ls v. liart z 77K. 218 l 1908) , the t:ourt 
held that a suit to ca ncel a lease i s equitable in 
its nature and one in which a jury may not be demanded 
as a matter of right. 
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In Atkinson v. Crowe BOK. 161 ( 1909 } , the plaintiff' 
sought an injunction to permit entry onto t he defend -
a nt1 s land for t he p urp ose of mi n in g coa l which the 
plainti f f cl a i med wa s ri ghtfully his , and which right 
the defendant denied. The Gourt held tbat the question 
to be settled was the ownersh ip of t h e co al, and that 
the p l a i ntiff was attemp ting to try out a question of 
title to the coal without a jury, a.nd then t ake p os-
sess ion of the co al under the p rot ection of an injunc-
tion which would prevent the oppos iti on of the defendant. 
In an action commenced for the pur p ose of settling dis-
puted questions of tit le to r eal estate, and to recover 
the possession thereof, eit her party is entitled t o a 
jury as a matter of ri ght, regardless of the fo rm in 
which a ction may be brought . 
In Gordon v. Munn 83K. 242 (1910), the ~ourt 
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held tha t in an action of p artiti on where the issues 
disclo se the real co ntroversy to b e a s to the title an d 
pos session o f t h e re al estate in controver sy , tha t 
question must be tried before a jury i f either party so 
desires. this case inv olved a question of parti tion of 
rea l e s t ate among hei rs. 
In State v. ~i nderholm 84K. 603 (1911 ) , the 0ourt 
held that a statute p rov i d ing for a jury, in lunacy 
inquests, o f four persons, one of who m must be a phys-
ici an does not vi olate the ri gh t to a tri a l by jury a s 
guaranteed in t h e constitution. On app e a l from tne 
p robate court to the di strict court the nature of a 
l un acy proceeding is not changed a n d th e jury provis-
ions of the civ il and cri mina l codes are not ap pl i-
cable. A lunacy hea ring is not a consti tutional trial, 
but is merely an inquest fo r the benefit of t h e person 
in qu estion and bears no resemb l ance to an action 
eith er ci v i 1 or criminal. It i s n ot a case in which 
the cli erit is j u dged at fault or in defaul t and for 
which there is ·a forfeiture of constitutional liberty. 
In Balch v. Glenn 85K. 735 (1911 ) , p reviously 
cited, the uourt held that under the police p ower a 
person's orchard may be destroyed as a measure to 
control ~an Jose scale, and tha t no previous notice 
or jury trial is necessary. Such delay would impair 
the general welfare. 
In Cole v. vrum 109K. 148 (1921), the ~ourt 
held that an action to contest a will is one in which 
the p a rties are not as a matter of right entitled to 
a jury. Such actio n is a statutory proceeding in 
which the legislature is fully comp etent to disp ense 
with a jury. 
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In ln re u1ancy 112K. 247 (1922), the petitioner, 
on charge of vagrancy, was tried by a J ustice of the 
Pease wher e he waived his ri ght of trial by jury by 
not demanding one a s he mi ght have done according to 
statute. ~ater the petitioner charg ed tha t he wa s 
denied a trial by jury . 'l'he Curt held tha t vagrancy 
was not a felony and that trial by jury cou l d properly 
be waived. P etitioner had waived hi s right by failure 
to ask for such a trial at the proper ti me. 
In stat ·e v. Lee 113K. 462. (1923), the defendant 
charged that his automobile could not be confiscated 
for transporting liquor without a jury tri a l. The 
Court held that a jury is not required in suits in 
equity, brought to abate a public nuisance. :rhe 
sum.nary abatement of nui sane es with out judicial process 
or p,r ·oceeding· was well known to the common law long 
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prior to the adoption of the state constitution. under 
police power the state is justified in the destruction 
or abatement of public nuisances. 
In .:>pena v. Goffe 119K. 831 ( 1925), the Wakeeney 
'T elephone 1)ompany was disorganized by mutual consent, 
and the plaintiff contended that the proceeds were 
unfairly divided among stockholders by the corporation 
officials. After trial before the district court, 
the plaintiff appealed on the ground tha t property 
was involved a nd that he was entitled to a jury trial. 
fhe Court held that a suit by a stockholder of a dis-
solved corporation against former directors as trus-
tees to determine who are stockholdeIS entitled to 
share in the distribution of net corporate assets, 
and how such shares shall be co mp ut ed, and the amount 
that the p lainti ff is entitled to, is a sui t in equity 
and parties a.re not entitled to a jury as a matter of 
right. 
In Estey v. Holdren 126K. 385 (1928), the 
plaintiff brought suit against a corp oration that 
had contracted to buy a specified per cent of the gas 
produced by her wells and then had failed to do so. 
'l'he defendant succeeded in getting the case assigned 
for trial -before a referee, charging that a jury trial 
would be long and tedious and would involve presen-
tation of comlieat ed and technical facts as matters 
of evidence. After objecting to the referee to no 
avail, the plaintiff by mandamus invoked the ~upreme 
Court to require the respondent to grant a jury trial. 
The Court h el d t hat the issues raised by the p leadings 
determine t he nature of the action, and that here the 
plaintiff knew exa ctly what was her due under h er 
contract and the r e was nothing in t he case i n the 
nature of equity. the f a ct that the trial wou ld oe 
long and tedious has no wei ght. The case mu s t go to 
a jury. 
ln State v • .l:loard of Educ a tion 1 3?K. 451 (1933 ) , 
the natter to be determined by th e court was the 
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amount of the valid existin g indebtedness of the school 
district on a certain date. '.Che Court h eld that such 
a proceeding is equitable in its nature and may prop-
erly be heard b y the district court without a jury. 
In !f;agey v. ~:ox West Coast theatres 139K. 301 
(1934), the !Jourt h eld that the question as to whether 
issues o:r fact in an action for the recovery of money 
are such as must, under our 1:Sill of !{ights, be sub-
mitted to a jury for trial or can be referred, is to 
be determined from the pleadings in the case rather 
than from the evidence. Where the trial of an issue 
of fact shall requ ire the examination of mutual ac-
counts, or when the account is long and on one side 
only, statute provides that it may be referred. ouch 
cases require - long and technical consideration of ac-
counts beyond the capacity of the ordinary juror. 
~ection 8 of the Bill of Right s: 
The right to the writ of habeas corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless the public safety re-
quires it in c ase of i nvasio n or rebellion. 
The writ of habeas corpus is in common use in 
our judicial system and it has figured in many cases 
t o bring the petitioner with his cont e ntions before 
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the court, but there are on record no cases charging 
direct violation of this section of the .tsill of .l:{ights. 
oection 10 of the .tsill of Hightsi 
In all prosecutions, the accused shall oe 
allowed to appear and defend in person, or by 
counsel; to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him; to meet the wit -
ness fact to face , and to have compulsory 
process to compel the at t endance of witnesses 
in h is behalf, and a speedy trial by an im-
partial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is a l leged to have been com-
mitt ed . .No person shall be a witness against 
himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense • 
In s t ate v . McCord BK . 161 (1871), the defendant 
was convicted of third degree murder in his first 
trial and in a second trial, brought on his motion, 
he was convicted of second degree murder. 1·he der·en-
dant them charged tha t he had been once cleared of 
second degree murder and wa s being retried for third 
degree murder only. 'l'he Court held that a new trial 
granted on the motion of the defendant in a criminal 
case, places the party accused in the same position 
as if no trial had occurred, and in no wise p laces 
him t wice in jeop ardy for the same of fense. 
J:n stat..e. v.· c.;assady 12K. 550 _(18 74), a p a rty 
was cha r g ed a s a principal in a burglary act, but was 
convicted as an acces sary. the defendant contended 
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that a party charged as a principa l under an i nformation 
cannot be convicted of being an acce ssary before the 
fact. The Cou rt h el d that an accessary before the 
fact may be charged, tried, and convicted as t h ough 
he were a principal. the defenda nt k new the nature 
of the accusation against him and ~eing charged as 
principal he wa s prepared to defend himself against 
conviction as an accessary. 
In ~ity of Olathe v. Adams 15K. 391 (1875), the 
defendant violated a city ordinance by keeping h is 
shop open on a holiday. rte was found guilty before 
a .f'olice Judge, but upon appeal to the district court, 
he was declared innocent by the cour,t. The city 
appealed to the 8upreme ~ourt, and the Court held 
that in a criminal case where the distriet court had 
declared the defendant innocent, even though faet 
showed such finding erroneous, he could not be tried 
a second time against his will. ~uch action would be 
putting the defendant ~twice in jeopardy~. 
In ~tate v. Potter 16K. 80 (18?6) , the ~ourt 
held that the constitutional r i gnt of a defendant in 
a criminal action to be tried ,rby an impartial jury 
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of the county or district in which the offense is a l-
leged to have been co mmittedff, is a mere p ersonal priv-
ilege which the defendant may waive or insist upon at 
his option. It is not a right con erred upon him 
from considera tions of public policy ; and public in-
t ere st s would not be likely to suffer by a waiver 
thereof. 
In ~tate v. Jones 16K. 608 (18?6), the Court 
held that a mere preliminary examination does not put 
tne accused in jeopardy within the meaning of the con-
s ti tut ion. une preliminary examination for a criminal 
offense is no ·bar to another preliminary examination 
for the same offense; nor is it any bar to a full 
prosecution for such offense, although the defendant 
may have been dis charged on the first preliminary 
examination. 
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in ~tate v. ~ehee l?K. 402 ll8?7 ) , the defendant 
was charged with burglary in the night-tin:e ( second 
degree/, but the jury returned a verdict of' third de-
gree burglary (day-time). The information h ad ex-
p ressly stated that whatever the defendant did, was 
done in the night-time. :l' ime here was an indispensable 
ingredient in the offense, and to convict the defendant 
of third degree bur glary on such information, autnor-
izea introduction of evidence to p r 'oved different 
fac ts than those stated. 'l'he Court h eld that the .de-
fendant wa s not informed of the nature of the accu-
sation against him and that upon a . information or an 
indi ctment for an of f ense consisting of different 
degrees , the jury can . only find tlle defendant guilty 
of a degree inferior to the one ch arged when the facts 
constituting the o f fense sta ted include the lesser 
off ense. 
In State v. Adams 20K. 311 (1878), t h e Court 
held that it was not error for the jury to inspe ct 
premises without the defendant accompanying them. 
ttere the defendant did not apply for leave to a cco mpany 
the jury, or 1m.ke any objection to their going, or 
present such acti_on of the court as grounds for new 
trial. There was here no violation of the clause 
,.,the accused shal l be allowed to appear and defend 
in person or by counsel, to meet the witness fact to 
face". This is a grant of privilege whi ch the ac -
cused may waive, and in this case the accused waived 
by failing to object to the procedure a t the time. 
ln In re ~crafford 21K. ?35 (1879), the ~ourt 
held that where, after the impaneling of the jury in 
a criminal case, t h e trial is terminated without a 
verdict through any unavoidable casualty, such as the 
deat h of a juror or the judge , the defendant has not 
been put in jeopardy, and may be again brought to 
trial up on the same charge. Also, when a trial is 
not finished in one term of court a nd is carried over 
into a new term, the defendant is not twice in jeop-
ardy. 
In State v. ~oark 23K. 14? (1879), the u ourt 
held that a defendant in a criminal prosecution is 
entitled, under the constitution, to compulsory pro-
cess to comp el the attendance of witnesses wit hi n 
the_ jurisdiction of the court in his behalf. Where 
material and necessary witnesses are duly subpoenaed 
in behalf of an accused in a criminal case, and su ch 
witnesses are within the jurisdiction of the court, 
it is an error to force said accused to trial, and 
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to conclude the trial, against h is protest, before 
the ret urn of the compulsory proces s issued to 
bring the disobedient witn ess into court, in the ab-
sence of any reason for it not being executed and re-
turned. 
In State v-. Wel l s 28K . 321 (1882), a juror on 
his Y. oi r QJ.~ st at ed that he had :f ormed an opinion 
tha t the defendant had committed murder . The district 
court overruled the defendant 1 s challenge of the 
juror . 'l'he ""ourt in review of the case h eld t hat ·the 
juror was comp etent and i mparti al in t his ca se be-
cause the prosecution f or the defendant admitt ed to 
. the jury that he had co mmitted murder, but was :ma.k ing 
a ca se that it was in self-defen se t hat he ha.d co m-
mit ted the act. 'l'he juror had formed no opinion on 
the is sue of self-defense. 
In s·t ate v. Miller 2;9K . 43 ( 1882), the Court 
held t hat a joror who in his roir states that 
he has formed an op inion a s to the guilt or i nno c ence 
of the defendant, but that such op inion is founded. on 
rwno r and t hat he ha s no bias or p rejudice a.gainst 
the defendant and f eel.s he could try t he ca se impar -
tially, is not a comp etent juror. Tuien are seldom 
conscious of being biased or :prejudiced. 
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In In re Donnelly 30K. 191 (1883), the defendants 
were charged with selling liquor without a license 
and asked for a trial before the J ustiee of the Peace. 
The county ~ttorney asked for merely a preliminary 
examination and a co mmittal to the district court. 
The defendants. were put in the cou nty jai 1, in 
default of bail, to await the next term of district 
court. ·:the Court held tha t defendants vrnre deprived 
of their right to a speedy public trial a s could have 
been legally p rov i ded by the J'ustice of t he .Peace, 
wh o in thi s ca se h a d concurrent jurisdiction with the 
district court. 
In St ate v. McNaught 36K. 624 (1887), the Gourt 
held that a ver dict of gui 1 ty on one count in a crim-
inal complaint, saying nothing as to other counts, 
is equivalent to a verdict of not guilty as to such 
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other counts, and where such a verdict has been rendered, 
and the defendant procures a new trial, he can be 
tried at the new trial only for the offense charged 
in the count upon which he was found guilty at the 
former trial. 
In State v. 1'ilney 38K. 714 l 1888), the Gourt 
held that an information for larceny, where the only 
description of the stolen property is "national bank 
notes, u. s. trea sury notes, and u. S. silver certi f -
icates, money of the amount and value of one thousand 
dollars~· without a llegation of the inability of' the 
prosecutor to give more specific description, is in-
sufficient, and Will be held bad on an objection 
seasonably go od. ouch an information violates the 
requirement t hat the accused shall know the nature of 
the accusation against him. 
In In re McMicken 39K . 406 ~1888), the vourt 
held that where a person under indictment for crime, 
and co mmitted to prison, is not bro ught to tri a l be-
fore the end of the second term of the court having 
jurisdicti on after such indictment is f ile d , the per -
s011 is entitled to be discharged, unless such delay 
happens upon his app lication, i s occasioned by want 
of time to try the case at such second term, or is 
for the purp os e of enabling the state to procure ma-
terial evidence. 
In State v . KnapR 40K . 148 (1888) , t he Uourt 
held that the trial of a defendant charged with a 
criminal offense cannot, upon the motion of the 
prosecutor or st ate, and against the objection and 
without t he consent of the defendant, be removed out 
of the county and district where the offense is a1_ 
leged to have been comnitted. Changes of venue are 
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to be to a county designated by the defendant. 
In In re .N ickell 47K. ?34 ( 1892), the defend-
ant in a liquor trial induced witnesses to absent 
themselves from court, and the trial judge cn~rged the 
accused with contempt and placed him upon the witness 
stand to prove the contempt charged. In review of 
the case the c.;ourt held that the petitioner was 
charged with a statutory crime of inducing witnesses 
to absent themselves from the court and that such pe-
titioner could not be compelled to cri minate h i mself 
by testifying fro m the witness stand. 
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In Sh.te v. Calhoun -50K. 523 { 1893), the t_;ourt 
held that a plea of guilty under threat of mob violence 
is not binding. Where the accuse d p leads guilty under 
such threat and even after he has served a number af 
years in prison, he has a right to relief from such 
sentence and plea by an action or proceeding in the 
same court in the nature of a writ of erro r coram nobis . 
I n State v. Price 55K. 606 ( 1895) , the c.;ourt 
h eld that prosecution may be in either county where 
prop erty is stolen in one county and taken to another. 
Such provision does not deny the accused a trial in 
the district or county in which the offense is a lleged 
to have been committed. 'l'he theory is that a thief 
is stealing property from the time he takes it up until 
he lays it down, although severa l counties may inter-
vene between these points . Each a sportation from one 
co unt y to an other is a fresh theft, and con stitutes 
crime i n each county. 
In State v. ~oulk 5?K. 255 ( 189 6), the uourt 
held that in all pro secutions the accused is entitled 
to be confronted with t~e wi tnesse s against him and 
to meet them face to face, and t estimony of a witness 
given upon a former tr ial, and which was written down 
by the co urt stenographer, cannot be read in evid:ence 
against the defendan t ex cept with his consent ., 
In State v . Tomblin 5?K . 841 ( 1896) , the Court 
held t ha t a defendant on tri al, charged vn t h a felony , 
has the ri ght gua ranteed to him by the constitution 
to meet the witnesses pro duced by the state , fa ce to 
f ace, and it is error to admit over hi s objection, 
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the deposition of a witness, taken out of t he state 
wh en he was not personally present, c ontaining impor -
tant testi mony, notwithstanding t he fact that t h e de-
position was taken on the applicatio n of t he defendant, 
on i nt errogat ori es prepared by hi s counsel and cr oss-
i nterrogatories prepared by both hi s c oumel and by the 
state. 
In State v. Moore 61K. 732 (1900), the def endant 
was required to plead in the absence of his counsel, 
who were non-residents of the county in which he was 
tr.ied, and Who, in answer to a telegram, had been 
notified by the county attorney that the case would 
not be set for trial until a later date. ln re-
viewing the case the Gourt held that the proceedings 
were in error, that the ~caused is entitled to assis-
tance of counsel at every stage of prosecution, and 
tha t the di strict court should have cl:PPOinted counsel 
or waited on oounsel already arranged f or. 
In state v . Alexander 66K. 7i 6 (1903), the Court 
held that where a jury is brought into open court and 
indicate that there is no reasonable probability of 
their being able to agree upon a ver dict and a.re dis-
charged from further consideration of the case, the 
defendant may be retried and he snot t wice put in 
jeopardy. 
I n sta te v. ~elson 68K. 566 (1904), the uourt 
seems to reverse the decision reached in 57K. 255 
and h olds that the fact that a witness against the de-
fendant in a criminal case is outside the state at 
the time of the trial, and therefore beyond reach of 
process , authorizes the introduction in evidence of 
the testimony given by the witness at a former trial 
of t:fule same case. The requirements of the .b ill of 
Rights that the ac cu sed sha ll be allowed to meet the 
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witness at a former trial of the same case. the re-
quirements of the ~ill of ~ights that the accused 
shall be allowed to meet the witness face to face is 
complied with in that he has already at the f ormer 
trial been confronted by the absent witness, and at 
the later trial meets the witness who g ives evidence 
of what such former testimony was. 
In .§tat e v. Harmon ?OK. 4"76 { 1905) , the Court 
held that where, in the trial of a criminal case, a 
witness who had gi ven testimony a t the p reliminary 
hearing was shovm to be absent from t he state and be-
yond the jurisdiction of t h e co urt, it is comp etent 
for one who heard the test imony of the absen t witness, 
and r em embers it i n sub~tance, t o testify to h is rec-
ollection of the same. Requirements of the Hill of 
Ri ghts are met in that the accused has faced the wit-
ness at the preliminary h e aring. 
In State v. lnman ?OK. 294 (1905), the Co urt 
h eld that tl~e contention that admission in evi dence 
of stat ernent s made out of court by a party on trial 
are incompetent, on the theory that th ey tend to 
make him a witness against himself, is without sub-
stance. This is not a violation of self incri(Jllitnation 
so long as such statements were ma de volunt arily by 
the defendant. 
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In State v. White 71K. 356 (1906), the Court 
hel d that if a person ~b out to be placed in second 
j eopardy does not, in some legal f orm, insist upon 
his con stitutiona l p rivilege before entering upon 
trial, the p rivilege is waived. An accused may , if 
he so desires take a chan ce on a second jeopardy, but 
he must mak e his election 'k noNn wh e n ab out to be 
place d i n second jeopardy . .tie . cannot h a zard a trial 
and when defeated r evert to a matter whi ch would 
h a ve prevent ed the trial . 
In Etate v. Campbell 13K. 694 (1906 ) , the ~ourt 
hel d that even th ough three terms of' the district 
court i ntervenes aft er indictment, so long as app eal 
by t he state is pending .defendan is no t held in 
violation of ttspeedy publi c trial'~ . The state must 
be given its r ight of appeal the same as defendant, 
and so l ong as such move is under way it is legal. 
In State v . hansford 76K. 678 (1907), testi mony 
in a criminal trial refreshed in t he mind of a juror 
a n event in his own past whi ch caused him to become . 
prejudiced, a nd upon h i s request, the court ex cused 
him and another jury was i mpanele d t o hear the c as e. 
In reviewing t h e ca s e, the Uourt h eld t hat under the 
circumstan ces t h is was a mistrial, and that the de-
f endant was not t wi ce put in jeopardy . 
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In State v. Tawney 81K . 162 ( 1909) , the ~curt 
held that it is not proper for a judg e in instru cting 
the jury to call special a ttention to an isola ted 
fact, and by making it prominent suggest to the jury 
that it is of gr ea te r signif icance and wei ght than 
other unmentioned f a ct s in t h e case which are of no 
less importance. 1he j udge shoul d abstain from i n -
dicating h is opin io n upon a material fact which it is 
the provin ce of t h e jury to dete r mi ne . ouch conduct 
d epriv e s the de fendant of an i mpa r tial trial . 
1n State v. 'l.'urner 82K . 793 { 1910), a revolver 
which the defendant dug up throu gh f' ear when the sher-
iff' call ed on him was l a ter used against the defenda nt 
in tri a l. In r eviewi ng t h e cas e , the ~curt h eld that 
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a document o r a rticle s tealthily taken f rom a de.rendant s 
p ocket or desk, or that was surrendered under t hrea t 
of p ersonal violence or t aken b y force, because of 
its wro ngful procurffinent creates no estoppel, and 
the story it tells is it s own and not tha t of t he de -
fendant . If the defendant should p roduce such evi -
dence i n obedience to an order of the court it is 
incompetent, because under such circumstances his a ct 
is pe rformed in t he capacity of a witness. ln short, 
the defendant cannot be compelled to testify, but 
prosecution may use at the trial information obtained 
from him under duress . 
In St ate v . liarmon 84K. 137 (1911), the Uo urt 
upheld the defendant in h is contention that a jury 
having tried a si milar c a se with the same witnesses 
is n ot a n impartia l j u ry . In this ca s e f ive of the 
juror s who sat on a trial and convicted a traveling 
man or rap e on one of t wo g irls, late r sa t on trial 
o f the de fend ant f or r ap e of the other girl. 'l'he 
Court h eld t ha t the jurors h ad reason to f orm op inions 
a s to the €,guilt of the def endant from eviq.ence given 
in the first case . 
In State v . tterbert 96K. 49 0 (1915), p revi ously 
cited, the Court h eld t hat a defendant i n b ast ardy 
proceedings is not entitled to a jury, and t h at t h e 
phr a se 0 all prosecuti ons 1• in section 10 of the · ..bill 
of' Hi ght s applies only to case s as p rior to the 
ado pt ion of the constitution and to cri minal cas es . 
In In re Mote 98K. 8 04 (1916), the def endant 
p leaded guilty in district court i n Heno t.:ount y to 
having commit t ed the cri me of bi gamy in .binney county. 
The Reno court sentenced the defendant , and ei gh teen 
months lat er he ch arged that Heno county had no j ur-
i sdi ct i on to a cc~pt his ' p l ea and render judgment. 
The Court held th at section 10 of the Bill of High ts 
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grants priv ileges whi ch may -be waived and pleading 
guilty waived such :privileges . 
In St ate v. Kurent 105K. 353 (1 919), t he uo urt 
held that in a contempt proceeding for the violation 
of a decree enjoining t he s a le of in t ox icating liquor 
and for acts done in maint a ining a nuisance, althou gh 
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a cri mina l pr o secution is pendin g ag a inst hi m for the 
same s a les -and a c t s • .tie is not the r eby put t wice in 
jeopar dy f or the same of :fense , since in one ca s e he 
is punished for a crime and in the other for con temp t 
of court. 
In St ate v . Criqui 105K. 716 p9191), the uourt 
held that a statute providing th a t if any morta l 
would is given , or poison admini s tered, in on e co unty , 
a nd death by means t h ere of" ensues in an ot h er co unty, 
i}ie, juris.diction is in either county , does n ot con-
travene section 10 of the b ill of Hights p r ovidi ng 
f or tri a l by jury of t he county or di strict in which 
the of fense is alleged to hav e occurred . There is 
nothing i n the co nstitution t hat settles the question 
of wher e the crime i s committed and t h is is pro perly 
decided by the le g islature whi ch in thi s case decided 
that the infliction a nd resulting de at h were pa rt of 
t h e same t hing . 
In State v . Satterlee llOK . 84 (1921), the 
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Court held that a statute providing penalty for "care -
1 ess or negligent handling or exposing nitre - glycerin 
violates section 10 of the bill of .rlights for reason 
that the statute does not name the acts which are 
prohibited and thus does not inform the accused of' 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him . 
in otate v. Johnson 116K. 58 (1924), the Gourt 
held th at a liquor still and apparatus taken from a 
dwelling house during the owner · s absence, flDy the 
sheriff and county attorney, acting without semblance 
of lavrful authority to search and seize, may be re-
tained by the sheriff, and may be used as evidence 
in a criminal prosecution against the p ossessor fo r 
maintai ning a liquor nuisance . The goods were obtained 
in violation of "search and seizure", but they were 
used as evidence not at the order of' the court and 
thus the court 1.vas not compelling self - incrimination. 
The Court deprecated such proceedings, but there was 
no rule against adn1itting evidence . 
in state v . ~lftman lloK. 214 tl9 24 J, the uourt 
held th at if the exact nature is no t known, charging 
murder wi th a blunt instrument is sufficient and does 
not ae:9ri ve the accused of kn owing the nature of' the 
accusation against him . 
In ~tate v . Bri ck Co . 11'7K. 492 ( 1924), the C.ourt 
held that a pers on brought to trial before a court fo r 
an offense triable by the court a lone is in j eo:pa rdy 
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the same a s he wou l d be if h is tria l had been begun 
bef ore a court and jury . Dis co ntinuance of the trial 
without the consent of the accused or an absolute 
necessity bars another p rosecution f or the ·s.a.me oi' f en se . 
1n State v . Allen 59K. 753 (1898) , the vourt 
held that where a def' endant h a s be en p laced on trial 
on a criminal charge and the jury is duly i mpaneled 
and sworn, the co urt cannot artitrarily d ischarge 
the jury in such case unless on aqsolute n e cessity, 
and for reasons wh ich ar e sufficient in law. Dischar g e 
of jury u n less thus justified wil l ope r a te as a n ac -
quittal a nd the defendant cannot agai n be put on 
tri al for the same offen se . Statutory grounds for 
dis charge of jury are: sickness of a j u ror, or other 
a ccident or calamity, or other necessity to be found 
by the court, or by consent of both parties , or when 
it satisfa ctorily a p p ears that there is no probability 
of the i r agr eeing. 
In State v • ..tford ll '7K . 735 ( 1924), the l;ourt h eld 
that a convict i on upon one count for having possession 
of intoxic ating liquor and up on another f or t h e sale 
of the same liquor doe s n ot violate the consti tutional 
provi s ion against douo l e jeoparay . K. eep i hg li quor 
is one kind of criminal c o.nduct , and selling it is an-
other and quite different l{ind; each is p u n isha ble . 
I n 0tate v . ~ cL augh lin 121K . 694 (1926) , the 
Court h eld that where, a ccording to stipula ted fa cts, 
the defend ant dra.i;tk a quantity of liquor and got into 
his automobile and drove it along a p ublic st r eet a nd 
wr e cked it against a curbiµg while in a drunk en 
s tup or, the def endant ' s co nduct c on stituted a si ngle 
c r i minal delinquen cy and n ot t wo d i s ti n c t cri me s c ar ry-
ing separ ate an d succes s iv e p un ishments . The tri al 
court should require the c ount y attorney to elect 
whether he wou l d stand o n t he c ount ch argi ng the de -
f en rlan t with driving an aut omobile in a p ublic stre et 
while in a drunken co ndition , or on t he co unt ch a r g -
ing h i m with be i ng dru nk i n a publi c pla ce . I f t h e 
defendant is cleared on one of t h e abov e count s , ne 
c annot b e h eld for t he other . 
ln state v . :irnrron 1 2 2K . 8 45 ( 192 7 ) , the Court 
h eld that an i nformation ch argi n g unl aw f u l sale of 
mortgaged p er so na.l prop ert y vi.here the only descri p -
tion of the pr ope rty was " a n undivided ha l f interest 
in 20 a cres of r11ea t of v al ue of over ~ 20 11 , is fat a lly 
defec tiv e . Th e defend e.nt was entitled t o have a def -
inite description of the pro perty in order t hat h e 
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mi ght p repar e his defe nse and t h a t he mi gh t not be 
su bj ec t ed t o anot h er p r os ecution be cause 01· indet·-
i n i te d e scri ption . 
In ~t at e v • .Ra zey 129K. 328 t 1929), t h e Court 
h eld t hat a st at ute vvh ich makes i t a crime f or a 
per son wh o nas ca use d inj ur y to a not h er p erso n by 
the op e r a t i on o f a moto r veh icle on a publi c h i gh wa y 
to fai l to ~t op and gi ve h is name , r e s i den ce, a nd 
mot or l i cense numb er and g i ve p e r t inent i nfo r ma tio n 
to t h e i n j 1-,red person ther eab ou t a nd to report t he 
ma t ter to t he s.f-1. e r i f f or ne a r est p ublic offic er d oes 
n ot v iol a te t he co ns tit ut i on al guar ant y aga inst self -
i nc rimi nat i on . 'Ihe ri ght to dr ive an au to mobile . is 
a p e r s onal pri v i leg e a nd a c cepi a n c~ of s uch priv-
il ege wa ive s c e rtai n r:i ghts . }'l so i t is pr o}_.) e r t o 
make such requ i r emen t s a s par t of t h e p olice p ower . 
I n I n re 1'rull 133K . (1 93 1 ) , the Cou rt hel d t hat 
wh ere t h e petitioner was arre st e d Jun e 19 , 1928 , a nd 
b oun d ov er f or t r ial, bu t wh ere n o i n f or ma tion wa s 
fi led by t he count y at t or ney until J u ne 20 , 1931, 
a nd no reaso n appears for the del ay , t h e p etitioner 
i s denie d a speedy tri al a nd is entitled to discha r g e . 
- I n I n re .Brow:n l -39K . · 614 ( 1934 ) , t h e ·j u r y wh ich 
had r e tired to deliberate up on i ts verdict w s called 
i nto court a.pd advi s e d by the c ourt tha t t h e judge 
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was going to absent himself and th at if t h e j urors 
agree upon a ver dict they shall obtain an env elo e 
from the bailiff' a nd sea l the verdict therej_n and 
131 
hand it to the ba ilif f ; who shall hand it to the clerk 
of the court, and then j urors may disperse , and the 
jury thereafter agreed up o n a verdict and foll owed 
the judge 1 s order.s . When cour t was reco nvened on 
ivlondey morning one of the jurors asked to change .h i s 
v er di ct. In revi ewing the ca se, the Court held that 
the verdict reached and sealed under t he above con-
ditions could not be ch anged . 'l'he Court i-n . th~ s ame 
case held that the defenp.ant, tr ie d f or ra.pe on 
Jfay 18, 1932, may be rear re st ed and charged with rape 
on a_ny other date without being :put twice into jeop -
ardy f or the s ame offense . 
In State v • .H.eynolds 140K . 2,69 ( 1934) th e 
Court held that lllhere the indictment or inf.orr$.tion 
is so defective i n form or Slfb stance that it will no t 
support a co nviction, it cannot f orm the basis of 
pro cee di ngs which will pu t the defen dant in jeopar dy 
and bar an other prosecution . In this case burglary 
was charged and stolen goods were descr ibed as n certain 
goods, war es a nd merch andise of v a lue of r2ore than ;jji2011 • 
Such informatj_on was held c1. s insuf f icient as a basis 
f or a tri al or for jeopardy; 
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In ~tat e v . Carr 151K . 36 ( 1940) , the defendant 
charged that his constitutional rigb.ts were violated 
in that he was not sufficiently informe d of' the 
charge against h i m in a statute wh ich provides , nany 
per son who shal 1 knowingly and wi llft1lly cormni t any 
irregularity or fraud whatever with the intent to 
hinder , prevent or defeat a fair expression of the 
popular will a t any election shal l be deem e d guilty 
of a felony ". The Court hel d that the j_nformation 
based on the statute was sufficient . A statute is 
not ne cessarily void f or un certainty becau se in 
crea ting the crime it doe s not define the offense , 
for if the o ffense is known to common law , the c 01mnon 
lav definition may be adopt ed . . ep osi ting of f alse 
and fraudulent ballots and the commission of acts and 
conduct 1~hich interfered with freedom and p urity of 
elections, wa s punishab le as a crime at common l aw . 
In this case t he purpose of the statute was not so 
much to denounce certain specific acts as to p revent 
a certai n result. 
In sta,t e v . Mccarley 152K . 18 ( 1940), the 
court held that testimony of a witness voluntarily 
given i n an in :µisiti on to det ern1ine the or igi n of 
a. fire, held by the fire mar shall, under t.h.e statute 
rel n. ting to the pro t e c ti on against fire , may be u s e d 
so far as relevant in a prosecution for arson subse-
quently brought against the witness. 
ln State v. :::inyder 20K. 306 l 1878), the Gourt 
held that the verdict of a jury wa s void where the 
bailiff, a witness against the defendant, spent the 
grea ter part of his time with the jury while they were 
deliberating. it is the duty of courts to enforce 
a ri g id a.11d vigilant observance of the provisions of' 
the statutes designed to preserve inviolate the right 
of' trial by jury 2nd the purity of such trials. .Ln 
this case the defendant did not have an impartial 
jury as was his right . 
ln State v. City of Topeka 36K. 76 (1886), 
previously cited, the Court held that " s,11 prosecutions'' 
as used ih section 10 of the Hill of .liights was in-
t ended ·to mean or to include only alJ criminal pros-
ecutions for violations of the laws of the state and. 
was not intended to mean or to include prosecutions 
for the violation of ordinary city ordinances which 
have relation only to the loca. affairs of the city. 
offenses against the public in general must be pro-
secuted for the :public in general, and with a jury, 
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if the defendant demands it; while of fenses aga inst 
the ordinances of a city regulating only city affairs , 
may be :prosecuted by the city wi thout a jury. 'l'he 
case here j_nvolved repair mf city streets which was 
deemed a local city af'fa ir. 
i n State v . Tucker 137K. 84 ( 1933), the uourt 
held that the defendant was not twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense where a judg e dismisse d a jury 
after long deliberat ion without coming to a verdict 
and upon satisfa ction tha t t h ey would not reach a 
verdjct and ca rried the case over to the next term of 
court . If the jury had been dismissed without reas -
onable evidence that they co u ld n ot agree on a verdict, 
then the defendant wou l d have been co· 3idered acquitted. 
in Levell v . ~impson ·142 K. 89~ (1935), t he de -
1·endant charged t hat in t h is trial and under t h e ha-
bitual criminal. act, the nature a nd cause of the ac-
cusation against him was not made clear. He contended 
that the jury dict.n' t know of h i s p reviou s convictions 
and did not rea lize the gravit y of' a guilty verdict. 
The Court h eld that where co mmission of a sec ond or 
subsecuent felony merely carries increa sed punishment 
on conviction, it i s neither necessary nor proper to 
include in the information any allegations respe cting 
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any prior convictions of the accused. 
SUMMARY 
In s ummary of the foregoing cases it may be 
stat ed that the i::)Upreme vourt of the state of Kansas 
has h eld its citi z ens to the following principles: 
1 . An action to cont est a wi 11 may be tried 
without a jury. (3K. 410) 
2. In all ori g inal proceedings the Supreme ~ourt 
can send issues of fact to a jury . ( 5K. 213) 
3 . The right of jury trial is not vi olated v1here 
one ccm freely appeal to a jury trial. l 12K. 622) 
4 . ln recovery of money, a man ' s rights can be 
determined against his will o rly by a jury. 
(13K . 17) 
5 . One is not entitled to a jury in proceedings 
to correct assessments . ( 16K. 411) 
6 . Determination of what properties may be 
attached by cr editors is a suit in equity not 
demand i ng a jury . {18K . 253) 
7 . A divorce case do es not demand a jury trial . 
t 30K . 712) 
8 . Where a charge is criminal at common Jaw , 
trial by jury must -be preserved . (30K. 758) 
9 . Determination of whether terms of a judg1nent 
have be en met does not demand· a jury trial 
l 38K . 675) 
10 . jury trial is not demandable t·or violation 
o f city ordinance requiring work on the streets . 
l 36K. 76) 
11. A l andowner has no right to a jury to deter-
mine whether his land may be incorporated into 
a city. {43K . 627) 
12. Jury trial is not demandabl e for violation 
of court injunction . l 46K . 695) 
13. Requirement of bond for appearance and for 
fine and costs before appeal can be made to a 
jury trial is denial of right 1..0 trial by jury . 
t 55K . 694) 
13? 
14 . Trial by a twelve-man jury cannot be properly 
waived in cases of :ffelony . l 61.K . 752) 
15 . Lo ca.ti on of boundary lines is a proceeding 
not triable by jury. l 63K. 633) 
16. Jury trial is not demandable in cases i nvol v-
ing violation of local police regulations. ~64K. 1) 
l?. A jury trial is not a matter o:r right in a 
s,~ warra.nto pro ceeding. l68K . 776J 
18. ln misdemeanors, the defendant may waive 
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jury trial or consent to fewer than twelve men 
on a jury . ( 69K. 792) 
19. Liquor prop erties may be destroyed without 
tria l by jury so long as there is a right of 
, appeal. t 71K . 511) 
20 . A jury may not be demanded in a suit to can-
cel 8. lease . l 77K . 218) 
21 . A jury is demandable in actions to recov-er 
or to settle questions of title to property . 
( SOK . 161) 
2 2. A jury is not a ri ght in a lunacy inque st . 
(84K . 603) 
23 . To control orcha rd disea se one's trees may 
be destroyed witb out previous notice or jury 
trial. (85K. 735) 
2 4 . In mi sdemeanors right · to a jury is waived by 
I 
failure to ask for such tr ial at the proper time . 
( 112K . 247) 
25 . n automobil e used to transport liquor may 
be conf i seated without a tri a l by jury . t 113K. 462 ) 
26 . Division of assets in a dissolved corp or a tion 
is a case in e quity and not entitled to a jury . 
( 119K . 831) 
27 . ~ong and tedious evidence is no excuse for 
denial of a jury trial. ( 126K . 385) 
li9 
28 . Determination of the indebtedness of a e;ov -
ernmen tal nit is a case in equity not demanding 
a jury . (13 7K . 451) 
29 . Jury may be denied in actions for recovery 
of money where mutual accounts mus t be examined 
or tbe account is long . ( 139K . 301) 
30 . A new trial granted on request of the cte -
fendEnt, places him in same positi on as if no 
tria.l had occurred . (SK . 161) 
31. An accessary before the fact rnay be charged, 
tried , and convicted as though he were a prin -
cipal. ll2K. 55) 
32 . . here a district court declares a de -
fendant innocent , even thouc;h fact shov,s su ch 
finding errone ous, he c&.nnot be tried ;,,, second 
t · ne against his will . 15K. 391) 
33. Trial by an impartia.l jury in the county 
in wr.ich the offense is 8lleged to ha"Te be1;;n corn-
n2it ed is a privilege .hicr· rnay be w .i ed . (1 6K . 80) 
34 . r. mere prelimim: ... ry riearing doe c no-: put trrn 
accused in jeo:._.,ardy . (16'L . 608) 
35 . jury cannot t.:.nd a defenda. t guilty of 
crirrc 1n a diff'ersr.t degree tha.r. c:..a.r-gsd., v -
lees tr.e f,:1 .. cts oor.stit1 ~ir.£ t·_e e,~fen~.e chargr-::d. 
:.r.c:: ·cJe ... te o.' ::"ferer t degree . l 'Tf . 4 2 J 
36 . The defendant waives by f a iling to ask for 
the privilege of accompanying jury to site of 
crime . l 20K. 311 ) 
..... .. 
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37 . Where trial is terminated. by death of a juror, 
defendant may be retried witbout doubl e jeopardy. 
l 21K . 735) 
38. ~ourt must compel witnesses to attend in 
behalf of the defendant. l 23K . 14'7) 
39. Juror is disqualified only for opinion 
formed on t h e issue in the case, not for other 
opir j_ons. { 28K. 321) 
40 . Juror who has formed an opinion on the 
guilt of the defendant cannot be considered com-
p e tent • l 2 9K • 4 3 J 
41. Where J.P. has jurisdiction and defendant 
demands trial, case cannot be bound over to 
district co urt. l30K. 19lj 
42 . A verdict of guilty on one count and silence 
on other counts is equivalent to acquittal on 
the o-ther counts . {36K. 624) 
43 . An i ·nfor mat io n for larceny should speci:t·-
ically des crib e the stolen property . l38K. 714) 
44. Where an indictment goes by t wo terms of 
court wi thout any apparent reason for not being 
brought to trial ,, the defendant is entitled to 
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be discharged . ( 39K . 406) 
45 . Changes of venue are to be to a county d.e-
signat ed by the def end ant. ( 40K . 148) 
46 . Defendant charged with a statutory crime 
cannot be compelled to take the witness stand. 
l 47K . 734) 
47 . A plea of guilty under threat of mob vi-
olence is not binding. l50K . 523) 
48 . Prosecution may be in either county where 
property is stolen in one county and taken to 
another . ,55K. 606) 
49. Testimony from a former trial cannot be 
read from the court stenographer ' s notes vri thout 
consent of' the accused. l 57K . 255) 
50. It is error to admit deposition taken ::t~r om 
witness outside the state where accused was not 
present at the taking of such deposition and to 
which he objects . ( 5'7K. 841) 
51. 'rhe accused is entitled to assistance of 
counsel at every stage of prosecution . (.61K. 723) 
52 . Where a jury in open court show that they 
cannot rea ch a verdict , defendant may be retried 
without doub l e jeopardy . l66K . 726) 
53 . JJeposi tion from witness who faced the accused 
in a former trtal may be admitted against defendant's 
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oojection. t 68K . 566) 
54. A witness may testify to what anoth er 
witness said against the accused in a preliminary 
lea ring against objection of the defendant. 
( 70K. 476) 
55. ::-;tatement s made voluntarily by the de-
fendant out side of court may be admitted in ev-
idence in court. (70K. 894) 
561 A defendant cannot hazard a second trial 
and t h en when defeated object on the g round of 
double jeopardy . ( 71K . 356) 
57 . "Spe edy p ub l ic trial" is n ot violated so 
long as appeal by the state is legally pending . 
( 73K. 694) 
5fr. Where a juror becomes prejudiced fo r reason 
du ring a trial, jury may be discharge d and a 
mistrial declare d . ( 76K. q78) 
5 9 . l!'or judge to i ndi cat e h is opinion up on 
materi a l facts, deprives the a ccused of impar-
tial trial. ( 81K . 162) 
60 . Prosecution may use at a trial · information 
obtained from a defendant under duress . (82K. 793) 
61. jury having tried a similar case wit h the 
same witn e sses is not an impartial jury . 
( 84K . 137) 
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62. uAll prosecutions'' in section 10 applies 
only to cases as prior to the adoption of the 
constitution. ( 96K. 490) 
63. P lea of guilty in a foreign county waives 
r i ght to hold tri a l in county of the offense. 
( 98K. 8 04) 
64. In sale of 1 j_quor, a defendant may b e p un -
ished for the crime co mnitted and for co n tempt 
of court at the same ti me without double jeop ar dy. 
( 105K . 353) 
65. I nfliction in one cou n ty and dea th in anoth er 
makes either county proper venu e for tri a l. 
l 105K. 716) 
66. A st a tute i mposing penal t y for crime mus t 
clearly describe the acts prohibited. ( l l OK. 8 4 ) 
67. Liquor stil l taken Wi t hout warrant may be 
used ~gainst the defend9?t in trial. (11 6K . 58 ) 
68. Charging murder with a. blunt instrument is 
sufficient information where e xact nature not 
known. l l 16K. 214) 
69. :J..'rial before a judge is jeopardy the same 
as trial before a jury. ( 11 ?K. 492) 
70. Arbitrary discharge of jury operates as an 
acquittal for the accused. (59K. 758) 
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71. Possession of and selling o f liquor con sti-
tutes two different crimes and two separa te con-
v ictions is not double jeopa rdy. ( 11 ?K. 735) 
'7~ . A def end ant driving a car mile drunk can-
not be held on tha t count and on ~ separate 
c ount of being drunk j_n a public place . ::; t ate 
must ele ct one count . ll21K. 693) 
73 . ttequiring hit-and-run driver to stop and 
give informa tion is not self-incrimination. 
( 129K. 328) 
74. An arrest with. no i nformation filed by the 
county attorney until t wo years later wi t h no 
reason for delay is denial of sp~edy trial and 
entitles accuse d to discharge. {133K. 1 65 ) 
75. jury verdict reached a nd sealed cannot 
be later changed . (139K. 614) 
76. Electing a different date for r ape in a 
second trial is a neVl.r off ense and is not doubl e 
jeopardy . ( 13.9K . 614) 
77. Wh ere information is so defective as to fail 
to support a conviction it cannot serve as a basis 
for jeopardy. l 140.K . 269) 
78, Where an off ense is known to co mmon law 
and the statutory definition is not clear, the 
common law definition may de adopted . (151K. 36) 
9 estfunony V ar-11 gi-van i a:o in · s - t , on 
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GHAPTER IX 
SUWl ARY AND UONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
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::since most of the two hundred fifty-four cases 
presented in this study establish separate and dis-
tinct p rinciples, it is a problem to make a final 
summary. f·he summaries given at the end of each 
chapter are complete, and a complete final summary 
would amount to a rest a t ernent of these chapter sum-
maries . However, an attempt will ,be made in this final 
chapter to present some of the genera l prin ci ples 
which the Court ha s established. 
In making a summary of personal rights guaran-
teed to the people by the uonstitution of the s tate, 
it is well to point out an imp ortant difference be-
t ween the state constitution and the federa l consti-
tution. 0on·gress can ri ghtful l y enact only such 
legislation as i ,s within the powers granted by the fed-
eral cunstitution. In contrast to this situation , t h e 
constitution of a state limits rat.her than confers 
power, and where a st a tute is attacked as unconstitu-
tj.ona.l, the question is not whether its provisions ar e 
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authorized by the constitution, but whether they are 
prohibited by it. ~ince under a state constitution 
the peo ple have all governmental power and exercise it 
through the legislative branch of government, the 
legislature is free to act except as it is restricted 
by the state cons ti tut ion and by the authority of 
the federal government. ln accord with this principle, 
t h e state legislature may regulate pe rsonal liberties 
except as limited by the provisions in the ~ill of 
Rights . 
!:etition; Arms; Worship; .Press; .l:!lmoluments 
The section of the Hill of Hights granti ng the 
right of petit~on and assemblage i s clearly stated 
and decisions of the Supreme uourt seem not to h ave 
altered its meaning in any way. 
Under the right to bear arms, the tiourt has estab-
1 i sh~d a definite principle in holding that such right 
applies only to the bearing of arms in the militia 
or in other milita ry organizati ons provided by law, 
and does not limit the legislature in regulating the 
p romiscuous carrying of arms by an individual. 
'l'he uourt in a number of decisions bas esta ·blished 
the principle that one is free to worship according 
to the dictates of his conscience, so long as his wor-
ship does not in any way tend to create public . dis-
turbance or tend to force others to worship in the 
same ma nne r. 
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The Court has held that one is free to write or 
to speak the truth so long as the truth is not detri-
menta l to the interests of the public in disturbing t h e 
harmony and happiness of society or maliciously an-
noying or injuring others. Much leniency .has been 
shown in permitting abuse of the truth in p o l itical 
campaign s. i.ilo long as one accepts respo n sibility for 
a statement and contends that he makes such stat ement 
i n the intere sts of' the public, he may make even f a lse 
assertions against a candidate. 
The question of heredity emoluments and honors 
confern~d by the state has nev e r been bef ore the 
Supreme uourt. 
Equal rights; .Politic al pow er; .Powers retaine d by t h e p e op l e 
In the many cases which have charged violation of 
equal right~, the Uourt has established the principle 
that the welfare . of the public comes before t h e rights 
of any individual, and even where those individual 
rights seem to be guaranteed in the constitution, they 
mey be properly restrained under the police power of 
the state. 'fhe section in the Kansas Constitution deal-
ing with special privileges differs from simila r sect i ons 
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in the constitutions of most states in that it does 
not definitely p rohibit discrimination. 1'he Court 
h a s pointed out that the wording of this section 
permits the granting of special privileges so long 
as those privileges can be altered" or revoke d by the 
legislature. 'l'he principl e has been establish ed t hat 
the clause prohibiting t h e g ranti ng of special p riv-
ileges and immunities refers to p olitical privileges 
and not to privileges relating to property rights. 
Special regulations may be ma de to apply to those 
h olding pub l ic offi ce, . memb ership in p rofession s li-
censed by the state, or other similar positions. ::-;uch. 
persons have a special status granted by law, and 
for the st ate to tak e away from t h_ s e persons priv-
ileges whi ch oth er individuals do not even p os sess is 
not viol a tion of equal protection of the law. 
in summary of the princip les established con-
cerning political power .and p owers of the people, it 
may be stat ed that all p ower is inh erent in the people, 
limited only by absolute ri ght and the constit u tion. 
1he legislature acting for the peop le can do whatever 
is not in -:::conflict with a sense of ab solute right and 
the constitution. 'i'he l eg islature cannot delegat,e 
~ ny of its legislative power to other g overnmental 
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departments or agencies. 
Transportation a nd co r rup tion of blood; 'l' rea son; ooldiers; 
Search and Seizure; I mprisonme nt f or debt; Frope rty Rights 
In the few cases that have been b ef ore the (;;curt 
c ncerni ng corrup tion of b lo ok , i t has bee n h eld that 
withhol ding prop erty from an heir wh o murders h is as -
cendan t does not invoke corrup t ion of blood or f ore-
f eiture of estat e. 
:::iecti ons dealing with trea son and wi th the quarter -
ing o f soldie rs ba:ve never been before t h e ::iup r eue 
Cour t. 
Und er sear ch and sei zure t he uourt has h eld that. 
an individual can be arre sted only on l)rop er affi r mation 
and not on mere hearsay or susp icion . Hecords and 
documents may be calle d into court, but mus t b e re-
turned to the owne rs . 
'l'he Court bas est ablish ed t h e principle t ha t an 
indivi d ual is protected from impriso nment for debt 
only in liabilities aris i ng up on contra ct a nd where 
no f raud is involved. one may be i mprisoned for 
failure to pay cost s o f trial or f or 'fai l ur e to pay 
road tax and the Bill of Ri ghts is not violated. 
So far as prop erty rights of citizens and al ien s 
ar e conc·erned, t he supreme Court has estab li shed t h e 
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p rinciple tha t in those cases where st atutory regulatio n 
is ab sent the rules of common law shall apply. 
~lavery; Bail; Justice ithouifl De:1,ay 
The Court has h eld that slavery an d i nvo lunt~ry 
servitude are not invoked in f o rcing citi z.ens to wo r k 
on the roads in lieu of poll tax payment or in re -
quiri ng prisoners to work on the streets. 
Under the section d ealing with ba il a.nd puni sh-
ment f or crime, the Court has esta blished the prin-
cip le t ha t it is the nature of the punish ment and not 
the dur ation tha t determines vmether it is cruel and 
u nusual. 
In considering t he sect ion guar ariteeing remedy 
by due course of 1 aw and justice without delay , the 
Court has held that remedy by due c ourse of law 
means repar ation f or injury, ordered by a tribunal 
havi ng jurisdiction, in due c ourse of p rocedure and 
after a fair hearing. In most of the many cases 
wh ich have charged vi olation of t h is section the Court 
ha s held that an individual is entitled to due course 
of law as herein defined, except i n t h ose cases where 
the g reater inter e sts of t h e public are menaced by 
granting such rights . In such cases the state may 
prope.rly invoke its police p evver to curb the individual 
in t h e interest of the co mmon g ood. 
Trial by Jury; Hab e as Corpus; 'l' rial P rocedure 
In est ab lishing t h e me aning of the section 
prov idir:g for trial by jury, the Gourt has p ointed 
out that the Constitution doe s n@ t i n any way ext end 
the r i gh t of trial by jury. 'l'he Con stitution does 
preserve that ri ght; it is not disturbed or limit ed 
but rema ins invi ol ate as it was in common law a nd 
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in territorial p rovision s p rior to t h e adoption of 
the Constitution. Only in t h o s e c ase s wh er e a jury 
cou l d have been obtained in 18 59 is such right 
guaranteed by the Constit ution today. Other important 
principles establish e d by the Court are that cases in 
e quity are triable without a jury ; any c h arge that 
was criminal at com ...mon law must be tried by a jury if 
demanded; a jury trial must be granted in questions 
to settle title to property; and one is not d epriv ed 
of trial by jury so long as he ca n app e a l to such a 
trial without undue re str i ctions. Un der poli ce power 
one ' s person or p roperty may be summarily handled 
wi t h out jury trial where the inter ests and welfa re 
of the pub lie are threatened. 
'l'he section guaranteeing the right to the wt .it 
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of habea s corp us bas never been carried to the Uourt 
f or interpret ation. 
The section granting to the a ccused certa i n 
ri ght s and protection in triaJ. procedure ha s b een b e-
f ore t h e Uourt on mor e occasions t han a ny othe r 
section of the Bill of .Ki ghts. All prov i sions in 
this sect i on have been held to b e per sonal privilege~ 
which may be waived e ither by def init e requ est on t he 
par t of t h e d efend ant or by h is failure to ask t bat 
s uc h p rivileges be granted to him. The Court has 
h eld that the a ccused is ent it 1 ed to counsel at 
every stage of a trial unless he d efin i t e l y waives 
such right, a nd for the court to proceed with ou t 
c ounsel is error. A jury can n ot f i n d a de f en d a nt 
gui lty of a cr i me not clea rly covered in the informa tion 
bringing him to trial, and any statute i mposing p en-
a lty for crime must clearly describe t h e acts d ec lared 
to be criminal, unless the offense has a common law 
definition which can be used. The cou rt must comp el 
witnesses to attend in behalf of the def endant. Le-
p osition taken i n the absence of the accused and where 
t h e accused has never faced the witness ca nn ot be 
used in court aga inst him. Statements :made voluntarily 
by the accused outside the court can be used agai nst 
hi m in trial, and documents or evidence obtained 1·rom 
the accused, even under duress, may b e used against 
him without vi olation of the g uarantee tha t he s..>iall 
n ot be colinpelled to witness against himself. A n ew 
tri a l does not cons titute double jeopardy. Only in 
a trial where a defenda nt could have been co nvicted 
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a nd punimed is he subje ct ed to jeopa rdy. Chang e of 
venue is to be to a county desi gna ted by t he def endant • 
.r>rosecution may be in either or any of a number of 
count ies wh ere stolen goo ds a re carried across county 
lines or fa t a.l inf liction occurs i n one county and 
death i n a noth er. A jury is n ot impar tial wh ere any 
op inions as to the guilt of t he accused have b een 
p reviously f orme d or where a judge indica tes h is opinion 
up on material facts. 
Conclusions 
It is a pp a rent tha t many cases f ind t h eir way 
to the state Sup reme Court on the strengt h of s ponsor-
ing lawyers or for r .easons other tban the va lid n eed 
f or review. More than one-th ird of the ca ses examined 
in this study--all of t hem cases which w ere carried 
to t he ~upreme Court at lea st p a rtly f or r ea son that 
they violated sections of the Bi ll of ~ights--were 
found to so ineffectively c...vi allenge these constitutional 
provis ions that contentions were dismissed by the 
uourt without argument. .illvidently many cases are 
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. padded wi' th charges of' constitutional viol ations for 
the oole purp ose o f strengthening chan ces for appeal. 
The Supreme Uourt justices are ordinary hu man 
beings and are subject to all the frailHies of man. 
Many decisions have come fr .om a closely divided Court, 
and decisions bave been rendered when the argument 
offered l'.)y the Court itself was apparently as strong 
for the dissenting op inion as for the majority. 
study of a rguments of the Court through _~ the y ear s shcwirs 
muc h incons istency and even fa ilure to make use of 
strong p rece dents . Inconsistency in court argument 
and reasonging is apparent in cases 11 ?K 735 and 
121K. 693, and a gain in cases llOK. 84 and 151K. 36, 
all under section 10 of the ~i ll of Rights. 
'l'he Court h a s demonstrated its indecision and 
vacillation by its own reco rd. ln 1297 the c:ourt 
co mpletely reversed itself in one term on the question 
of the devolution of intestate pr o-party . (123K . 718 
and 124K. 539). Again the court reversed it self in 
c a ses a ppearing in 1905 and in 1914 by excl uding co mmon 
law inheritance in the fo r mer case and a ccepting it in 
the latter. ( 72.K. 287 and 92.K. 819) 
Much of our law i s court ..,.made. Many of the 
lib erties o r restraints which govern t he actions of 
the individual citizen are the result of the delib-
erations and decisions of the small g roup o f men wh o 
sit clothed in auth or ity on our oupreme uourt bench . 
Individual liberties are limited in t h e i nterest 
of the common welfa re. I t is a maxi m o f democratic 
government tha t the majority sha ll r ule, b ut t hat th e 
ind iv idual r ights of the mi n ority mu st be r e sp ected. 
A question wh ich our courts must deci de is j u s t h ow 
sma ll a minority sha ll b e p rot e ct ed. Certain l y the 
in div idual ri ghts of t h e very few cannot be uph eld 
whe n t hose rights a r e detriment a l or inconveni ent to 
the general public. 'l'h e Court may d ecide tha t under 
police p ower it is p roper for t h e stat e to co mpletely 
di sregard the rights and priv ile ges of t he few in 
order tha t the greater welfa re o f the pub lic may b e 
p r omoted. 
F inally it ma y be concluded tha t the que~ti on 
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of per son al liberties is 3.s much of an issue f o-r t h e 
court s today as at any ti me in the past. of the t wo 
hundred fifty-four ca ses whicl~ have est ablish ed mea n i ng 
for the Bi 11 of Ri gh ts, t wo were before the <.:curt i n 
the fir st decade of ou r state h i s tory; t wenty appeared 
i n the decade 1871-188 0; t h irty-f ive in 1881-1890; 
twenty-two · 
forty- four in 
and fort - one 
1891-- ; fort -e · gbt i 19 1 - 19 O; 
911 - 1920; f rt - . o ·n 1921 -193 ; 
·n 193 - - 40 . n the fact of ei gh 
years of' . receden s one t expec t a decrease in 
cases calling -for int er ret.atio of' consti tuti o a _ 
rovisi s; bu i the i creas g c m_ exi · of' 
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os cr o~ .._., e eol)_e 
, d t e C urt, F e _a ... he {!u estion o~ :personal 
li erti e s an i d.'... · •dua l r i gh ... s to c ntin ue as an i -
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